Small scale enterprises in Greece and economic integration within the E.E.C. by Baltzakis, Efthymios-Paris.
EFTHYMÏOS-PARIS BALTZAKIS
SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES IN GREECE AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE E.E.C.
Thesis submitted to the University of Surrey in fulfilment 
of the Master of Philosophy degree in Economics
October 1982
& \ 5
ProQuest Number: 10130456
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10130456
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
SYNOPSIS
The likely effects of Greece’s membership of the European Economic 
Community on the rather large numbercof small-scale enterprises 
in Greek manufacturing industry has caused some considerable 
concern'to the business community and to the government*
This thesis undertakes theoretical and empirical analysis of 
the 'question. The Heckscher-Ohlin model combined with Rybczynski 
Theorem as elaborated by E.G. Johnson would predict a shrinkange 
in the importance of small-scale manufacturing sector. Additional 
"market structure" consideration would strengthen this 
conclusion.
The predictions of the theoretical analysis were tested by 
multiple regressions and the "beta coefficients" technique.
The empirical evidence suggests that small-scale enterprises 
have successfully withstood foreign competition during the 
first seven years of Greece’s association with E,E.G,
The theoretical and empirical analysis of my study, thus, 
permit a certain optimism regarding the successful integration 
of Greek small enterprises within the European Economic Community,
To the loving memory of my mother
"And there are a thousand ways to 
learn; but to enter so in the 
future, you need to be credulous"
0. ELYTIS: Odyssey
"To learn one must be humble"
J* JOYCE: Ulysses
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
I. The Athens Agreement : v
The Athens Agreement on Greece’s association with the European
Economic Community Chenceforth EEC) was signed on 9th July 1961 
and took effect from 1st November 1962. This association took 
the form of a customs union and involved :
[a) the prohibition between the Member States of the Community 
and Greece of customs duties on imports/exports and of all 
charges having equivalent effect, and
Cb) the adoption by Greece of the Common Customs Tariff of the
1EEC in her relations with third countries .
The timetable for tariff reductions to be effected by the Contracting
Parties was as follows. The first reduction was to be made on the 
. coming into force of the Agreement. The second to eighth reductions 
were to be made at intervals of eighteen months thereafter. The 
eighth and subsequent reductions were to be made each year thereafter. 
Each reduction was to be made by lowering the basic duty on each 
product by 10 per cent. Thus, the transitional period for attainment 
of the customs union was to be twelve years.
An important exception was, however, included in article 15CD ; a
1. The English text of Athens Agreement is published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities (Special Edition) 
January 1974, pp.7-54.
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transitional period of twenty-two years was granted for Greek tariffs on 
manufactures produced at the time of the coming into force of the Agreement. 
The timetable for the duty reductions on these products was to be as follows; 
a reduction of 5 per cent on the coming into force of the Agreement and 
further reduction of 5 per cent each at intervals of thirty months thereafter 
The duties thus reduced would constitute the basic duties on which the 
subsequent reductions were going to be made from the end of the tenth year, 
in accordance with the timetable laid-down, in the previous paragraph.
In addition, by article 18 of the Agreement Greece could establish (nominal) 
tariffs up to 25 per cent in order to protect the development of new
industrial activities. This discretionary measure could be taken within
the first twelve years of the Association ,and could last for nine years.
By article 52, Greece can assist financially exporting units within the 
first ten years of the Association. Thereafter, Community’s consent is 
necessary for the extension of such assistance.
The Agreement provided also for the abolition and prohibition of the
existing quota restrictions. In addition there were clauses providing 
for economic aid by the EEC to Greece and to facilitate capital movement 
between the two partners.
Viewed as a whole, the Agreement opened a large market for greek products 
but at the same time subjected the greek domestic market to a level of 
foreign competition hitherto unknown.
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The application of the Agreement was quite smooth till 1967. In that year,
however^ a military junta took over the administration of the country and all
clauses concerning aid and involvement of Greece with the EEC institutions were
suspended by the European Community. The tariff arrangements, however, remained
in force so that the trade liberalisation continued. In 1974, the military junta
was dissolved and civilian rule was reinstated.
. • ^
In 1975, the Karamanlis government decided to apply for full membership of the 
EEC. Negotiations for this were successfully concluded by the Athens Treaty, 
signed on 28th May 1979, under which Greece is admitted as full member to the 
European Economic Community as from 1st January 1981.
It was natural that the interest of Greek economists would be stimulated by the
possible economic consequences of Greece's association with the EEC. Professor
.* S.G. Triantis believed that the association would damage the prospects of economic
/2development of Greece. Especially on the industrial outlook he writes "..., the 
reduction of duties is liable to destroy infant industries, which in the long run 
might have become internationally competitive, abroad or at home. Also, the 
dismantling of Greek industries under the impact of foreign competition will reduce 
the economies of linkage and scale that might have helped Greek export industries 
and industrial development in general" (p.88). In short "The importance of the 
infant industry argument seems to have been inexcusably minimized (by the political 
leadership)" (p.110).
In reply. Professor J.S. Pesmazoglou. (the head of Greek delegation which
negotiated the Agreement and then Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece rejected
/3Triantis’ arguments as ill-founded.
2/ S.G. Triantis: Common Market and Economic Development, Centre of Planning 
and Economic Research (KEPE) Athens, 1955. ....  • ‘
3/ J.S. Pesmazoglou: Critical Choices of Economic Policy; Bank of Greece, Athens, 
March 1967, in Greek only.
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He stressed the need for Greece to follow an export-oriented development 
policy which could be successful only within a large free market such as
the EEC (p.lO). He rejected an "import-substitution" policy on the grounds
that such a policy would lead to serious waste of resources given the high
content of imported (raw and intermediary) materials in Greek products.
Besides, the limited Greek domestic market offers inadequate opportunities
for the development of managerial skills (p.47).
He is not', however, an advocate of laissez-faire. The Greek State should 
perform a more rigorous and active role in the allocation of (private and 
public) investment funds to the "desired" sectors. This could be done by . 
generous assistance to export-oriented units and èven by the establishment 
of new industries by the State Banks in case the private initiative is 
lacking. These state controlled units should be passed to private hands 
after their competitive viability is secured. The state should also
a. enhance the free play of competition in the domestic market (by, among 
other measures, generous financial assistance to small-scale industry) and
b. adopt a more favourable policy towards export-promoting foreign investment 
(pp.50-55).
4Perhaps the most rigorous analysis of the question was that of T. Hitiris;
I turn to this in the next section.
T. Hitiris: Trade Effects of Economic Associations with the Common Market; 
the case of Greece, N. York, Praeger Publishers 1972.
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II. Hitiris Study :
T. Hitiris attempted to measure the effects of tariff changes 
(consequent to the GreeK'^association with the EEC) on the greek 
balance of trade. He estimated the impact on imports and on exports 
and finally combined these to estimate the effects on the trade 
balance. His analysis was limited to the price effects only and. 
ignored any income effects that may result.
(a) Effects on Imports: The increase in imports consequent to a
5complete elimination of tariffs is given by'the formula :,
' 'j
where e . = elasticity of import demand
t. = tariff fateJ
Mj = the initial level of imports
Hitiris elaborated the above formula to take into account the 
fact that in case of customs union, there is a partial 
replacement C= substitution) of extra-union imports by intra­
union imports^.
5, op. cit. p.135
6. This substitution effect (.Ls^), which is caused by the 
alteration in the relative prices of imports from the two sources 
of supply, can be approximated by use of the definition of the 
elasticity of substitution, which is by definition :
e3 H fjlX Px
Where : intra-union imports, X : extra-union imports and P’s are
,,/cont’d
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Using his own estimates of the import demand elasticity
and of the substitution effect for 1961 trade figures,
his calculations .led' him to conclude "the abolition of
the greek tariffs'^on imports from the EEC increases
imports directly and indirectly by 43.23 per cent of the
pre-abolition imports from the same'source of supply.
This means an increase in the EEC share of the greek
import market from 44.74 to 53.60 per cent. Total imports
"7increased by about 8.35 per cent
Analysing the increase in imports in terms of trade creation 
and trade diversion, he estimated that "Trade creation” in 
trade with the EEC is, therefore, estimated at about 15.4 
per cent of the base year; total imports and "trade diversion” 
with non-EEC countries at about 8 per cent. "Trade creation" 
with non-EEC countries is estimated at about 6.3 per cent of 
the base year imports, so that the net outcome of the 
association is beneficial for the country”.^
Cb) Effects on Exports ; The effects of the elimination of the
9EEC tariffs on greek exports are measured by :
6.Count'd)
corresponding prices. The above formula is solved for 
which is the substitution effect and is added to intra- 
union imports and subtracted from extra-union imports leaving 
the total unaltered.
7. ibid, p.138
8. ibid, p.145-147
9. ibid, p.138
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t .X = B  ^ Xw w,i 1 + t . w,iW, 1
Where ; X^ = greeK exports to EEC i
te . ^ = export demand elasticity !
. ^  !
t . = — EEC tariff ratew, 1 i
Exports to non-member countries of ’the Union are assumed to 
stay unaltered.
He estimated that "...exports to the EEC will rise by 20.19 
per cent as compared with the 1961 exports... This increase 
means, in fact, a 6,14 per cent expansion of [Greece's] total 
■ exports in the base year,
[cl Balance of Trade ; Combining the estimates for imports and 
exports, he concluded that "...imports from EEC countries 
will increase more than exports to the same countries and 
the deficit on the balance of merchandise with the EEC will 
be increased by the association" while the "balance of 
merchandise with non-EEC countries will not significantly 
change after the association."^^
His overall conclusion, thus, is that although association may have
«favourable dynamic effects, the overall static effect will be an
increase in imports leading to a large trade deficit.
But how has experience born out his predictions? In order to compare
his estimates with the actual figures of trade flows for 1965 and
1975, I constructed Table I.l.
10. ibid, p.140
11. ibid, p.148
TABLE I.l
Imports
TRADE IN MERCHANDISE
EEC/Other Exports
EEC/Other Deficit
Millions of Drs.
current prices per cent deficit
1965 EEC 12,988.8 ^ 2,090.7 . 10,898.1
77.66 53.69
Other 16,725.3 3,894.3 12,831.0
Total 29,711.1 . ‘ - 5,985.0 23,729,1
45.93
54.07
100.00
1975 EEC 58,889.7 22,176.7 36,713.0
84.16 75,52
Other 69,961.0 29,365.7 40,595.3
Total 128,850.7 51,542.4 77,308.3
47.45
52.55
100.00
Note: Trade figures include the categories included in Hitiris’ study, • 
namely 0 [Food and live animals], 2 [crude materials, inedible 
except fuels], 5 [Chemicals], 6 (Manufactured goods classified by 
raw materials], 7 (Machinery and transport equipment].
Comparison with Tables 27 [p.146] and 28 (p.149] of Hitiris' study is 
limited to a comparison of ratios only, since actual figures are at 
current prices while Hitiris' are at 1961 prices.
Comparison reveals that the reorientation of trade that actually took 
place in the first 13 years of association was not as dramatic as 
predicted by Hitiris. It must be reminded, however, that Hitiris 
worked under completely static assumptions (ceteris paribus] to arrive 
at his estimates; while real world phenomena reflect dynamic influences 
as well.
Table I.l suggests also that the effects of association with the,EEC 
have not been entirely unfavourable. However, these figures as well 
as Hitiris study, deal with an aggregate picture of the economy and may.
_ 8 _
perhaps, conceal rather diverse effects on particular types of industries 
or on particular types of enterprises.
III. Why this study • _  '
The present study does not attempt a detailed analysis of the multiple
effects of the first critical yeai*s of Greek association with the EEC.
Its field of investigation is confined to the effects of trade liberalisation
(i.e. increased foreign competition) on the small sector in Greek industry
is disproportionately large and is believed to constitute a major problem
12/for the growth of the economy. The question is of some topical interest
!and concern in Greece in view of her new status as full member of the 
European Economic Community.
The plan of the study is as follows: In Chapter II some theoretical aspects 
and policy implications are discussed. Chapter III contains an analysis of 
the comparative position of the two size-classes- of Greek Industry. . 
Chapters IV and V contain the main empirical investigation of the thesis 
as well as the analysis of its results. Chapter VI discusses the industrial 
policy followed by Greek State vis-a-vis small enterprises while Chapter VII 
' contains an appraisal of this policy.
12/ According to the latest Greek Industrial Census .(1978), 264,140 persons 
(39,5 percent) out of 671,497 persons of the manufacturing workforce 
are employed in establishment with less than 10 persons. * * ■
As far as trade liberalization is concerned, the overall import duties 
amounted to 34.44 per cent of total imports in 1963 and to 28.90 per cent in 1970. (a decrease of 16 per cent) (Public Finance Statistics' 
N.S.S.G.)
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY ASPECTS 
The question at hand (i.e. trade liberalization and its impact on market 
structure) covers, I think, more than one branch of economic theory. It 
involves Customs Union,Economic Development, Economic Growth, International 
Trade and Industrial Economics.
T. Hitiris (op.citj gives an excellent review of the Customs Union Theory
in early 1970’s. Not to my knowledge has this theory been revolutionized
since then. On, the other hand Greece in the early 1960’s was not, in my
view, a ’’typical" underdeveloped country. True the per capita income was
low compared to Western Europe but high enough to permit a rate of saving
(around 23 per cent) sufficient to finance growth. Moreover there was a
/Ikiucleus of managerial class in the country.
In his book. Industrial Capital in Greek Development, Professor Howard Ellis 
and his associates stress as causes of backwardness the lack of competitive 
environment, institutional factors, and commercial policies unsuited to the 
problems of industrialization. I shall have the opportunity' to refer to this 
book below. .
/I It is true that Greeks have been good merchants since Homer’s time. But
it is often overlooked that the seeds of industrialization (from 1850 to
1920) in Romania, Ottoman Empire and Egypt were sown by Greek enferpreneurs
Even in the small Greek state of the second half of XIX century the small thebarren island of Aegean, Syros, experienced industrialization which came 
to an halt because of the Kfach of Vienna in 1880’s and the protection 
that Ottoman Government followed thereafter.
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I shall therefore confine my survey to Growth, International Trade and
Industrial Economics. I will not attempt a synthesis of these branches a task.
2/demanding’Arrovian abilities. I will try, instead, to give the main points 
which seem to me to be relevant. The reader should, thus, excuse the 
compartmentalization of the discussion; but this compartmentalization is the 
legacy of the Marshallian tradition of economic analysis, so useful to drawing 
testable results. Walrarian analysis would lead to beautiful theoretical 
constructions too general and too abstract to be*susceptible to empirical tests,
2/ "... if overall demand is still so small as to leave unexhausted the
economics of large scale production, the viability of perfect competition 
is brought into question. Although Ohlin and a host of writers before and 
after him have called for a useful theory of imperfect competition and 
international trade, that call has thus far not evolved a very exciting 
response." P.A. Samulson "Bertil Ohlin 1889-1979" J. of Intern. Economics 
May 1981.
The problem arises from the fact that monopolistic competition theory is 
partial equilibrium theory - and therefore permits the insertion of a great 
deal of empirical detail - whereas comparative cost theory is general 
equilibrium theory - and therefore is useful and manageable only when it 
can be kept reasonably simple, pp. 14-15 R. Vernon The Technology Factor 
in International Trade. N.B.E.R. 1970.
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I. THEORETICAL ASPECTS
An economy undergoing development (i.e. rising income per capita) is
bound to experience a change in its- structure moving from an economy
with extended primary sector to an economy with expanding industrial
sector to reach, eventually, the stage of a mature economy where the
tertiary sector (services) is preponderant. As Chenery epitomizes
"the accepted explanation of this relationship (between development
and structure) is the change in the composition of demand, of which
the decline in the share of food (Engel's Law) is the most notable 
3/feature." He adds "In searching for additional explanation of the 
rise of industry, it is natural to look for systematic changes in supply 
conditions as well as in demand with rising income. Here two factors are 
of general importance: (1) the overall increase in capital stock per 
worker; (2) the increase in education and skills of all kinds." (ibid.)
The combined effect of changing demand patterns and (human/physical)
4/capital accumulation, however, can be seriously modified through 
foreign trade. Not only consumption and saving / investment patterns 
change as income rises; patterns of trade, as well, change systematically
3 / H. Chenery: "Patterns of Industrial Growth" American Economic Review Sept. 1960
4/ .For an economist, economic growth and capital accumulation àre almost 
synonymous. It is safe, therefore, to say (paraphrasing Marx) that, in 
! order for a society to have economic growth: "Accumulate, Accumulate; 
that is the Hoses and the Prophets." ■
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/5with rising income levels. It is even possible that "... under certain 
circumstances economic expansion may harm the growing country, itself" '
(because of the deterioration **in the terms of trade). The twin problem
'—  7 /of trade effects on growth has been studied by Corden.
In order to explore the implications of the standard theory (Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson trade model in combination with Rybczynski Theorem)
for the problem of small-and large-scale industry, let us take Johnson’s
analysis and adapt it to the case of Greece in the 1960s'. I shall deal
mainly with capital accumulation, while the case of technical progress can
ft/ • .be worked out easily in an analogous way.
5/ H.G. Johnson: "Economic Development and International Trade" in 
Money, Trade and Economic Growth (Harvard University Press 1962)
He builds on a suggestion by J.R. Hicks expressed in his Inaugural Speech at Oxford in 1953,
fi/
7/
8/
J. Bhagwati: "Immiserising Growth: A Geometrical Note"
Review of Economic Studies, June 1958.
Corden, W.M,,: "The Effects of Trade on the Rate of Growth" in 
Bhagwati et alii; (eds): Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth.
North Holland 1971.
The taxonomy of various types of growth is as follows: pro-trade-biased growth increases the country's demand for imports and supply of exports more than proportionally to output; neutral growth increases the country's 
demand for imports and supply of exports in proportion to output; anti­trade-biased growth increases the country's demand for imports and supply 
of exports less than proportionally to output; in ultra-pro-trade-biased ^ t  f  -J *  m.* —  —  —  mmt 4w w,* —  — mm mm ^m ^m mm mm —growth more than the whole increase in national income is devoted to the purchase of imports so that the demand for home-produced goods actually falls and the country becomes absolutely less self-sufficient; in ultra 
anti-trade-biased- growth, more than the whole increase in national income 
is devoted to the purchase of home-produced goods, so that the demand for imports actually falls and the country becomes absolutely more self-sufficient. 
(Johnson, op.cit.)
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We assume two countries (trading under constant terms-of-trade), one 
relatively labour-aJboundant (Greece) and the other relatively capital 
intensive (the EEC), The latter (industrialized country) exports capital 
intensive manufactured goods .in exchange for labour-intensive manufactured 
goods in exchange for labour-intensive manufactured goods and the first 
(semi-industrialized) exports•labour-intensive.manufacturing goods in 
exchange for capital-intensive goods. It is assumed that labour-intensive 
goods originate in small-scale industry while capital-intensive goods 
in large-scale industry. Labour-intensive goods are necessary goods in 
consumption and capital-intensive goods are a luxury in consumption.
Each factor prefers to consume the product in which it is employed 
intensively so that progress in that product, by redistributing income 
towards that factor, increases the relative demand for the product.
With capital accumulation in semi-industrialized country, its labour-intensive 
production will be reduced and its capital-intensive production will be 
increased. Capital accumulation in the labour rich country will have an 
ultra^anti-trade-biased production effect. Under the stated assumptions all 
of the increase in output goes as income to the factor which is accumulating. 
Capital accumulation will increase the average proportion of income spent 
on capital-intensive manufactures. Hence the consumption effect will be 
pro-trade-biased in the labour intensive country.
"If the two shifts are biased in opposite directions, the net effect cannot 
be simply assessed. Because consumption of imports initially exceeds domestic 
production of them, biases of the same degree .... but in opposite directions
- 14 -
will not cancel out; instead the bias on the consumption side will dominate 
unless the production shift is sufficiently more biased than the consumption 
shift,.. But where there is ultra-bias in the production shift and the 
possibility of contrary ultra-J^ias in the consumption shift is ruled out,..., 
ultra-anti-trade bias in the production shift is sufficient to make the effect 
of growth ultra-anti-trade-biased" (ibid).
Thus, free trade does not reverse a conclusion which can be derived straight 
away from Rybczynski Theorem. Namely that there will be a shrinkage in the 
importance of small-scale industry as capital accumulation is under way.
Despite its beauty as a theoretical construction, the above analysis rests 
upon two assumptions which make it a rather poor approximation to reality : 
that is, perfect competition and constant returns to scale."The practical 
arguments for the establishment of common markets and free-trade areas are 
based on the premise that there are economies of scale which•are not exhausted 
within the limits of the size of nations etc." E.A.G. Robinson (Ê^ Introduction 
to Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations. McMillan 1960. As the question 
we are dealing with is closely linked with the existence of imperfect market 
conditions and variable returns to scale, we should examine what the relaxation 
of these two assumptions implies.
9/ In the proceeding analysis, we have implicity assumed the existence of
production units ( firms). As Arrow has pointed out "... so long as constant
returns to scale (are) assumed, the size of the firm (remains) indeterminate." Even Coase’s minimum conditions .for the existence of firms rest upon certain 
diseconomies in one-man (K.J.Arrow "The Firm in General
Equilibrium Analysis" in R. Marris and A. Wood (eds.) The Corporate Economy (Harvard University Press 1971) and R.H. Coase The Nature of the Firm" 
Economica (Nov.1937)).
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Introducing economies to scale, we have two important qualifications.
First, with economies to scale, the size of a country ( market size)
becomes a limiting factor to the expansion of firms. By his analysis,
Sylos-Labini shows how market^s absolute size may influence the final
10 /equilibrium of a situation "Créé par hazard". His conclusion is
that economies to scale favour-the creation of a relatively large number 
of small units juxtaposed with a few large units in the case of a small 
c o u n t r y ■.......
The existence of international trade is supposed to be a substitute for 
large home markets and imbalanced internal resources. There are however 
trading limits such as protectionist trade barriers, high transfer costs 
and active export promotion (where marketing economies to scale may favour 
large size). . . . , '
The empirical finding by Pryor that industrial (four-firm, four-digit)
concentration ratios among large industrial nations are roughly the same
11/while lower than among smaller industrialized nations, testifies, to
"Oligopoly and Technical Progress" Harvard University Press 1962 
Chapter II. His model is formalized by F. Modigliani in "New Developments 
on the Oligopoly Front" Journal of Political Economy 1958.
11/ F.L. Pryor, "An International Comparison of Concentration Ratios"
Rev. of Economics and Statistics (May 1972). Rank orders of concentration 
ratios by specific industries were found to be roughly the same in all 
nations.
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Ifty view, that international trade is not a perfect substitute•for "market 
size" and strengthens Sylos-Labini'thesis.
Drëze thesis is related: He says that a small country (such as Belgium) is 
handicapped when exporting goods^Tharacterized by "brand" differences between 
national markets. On the other hand, goods manufactured to international 
standards, even though manuf 
small country’s competition.
rds, actured in many varieties, are susceptible to12/  ■
Hufbauer has tested "the presumption ... that large industries are usually 
the property of large nations"(p.176). He has found "Apparently the benefits 
of scale economy specialization are distributed not entirely according to the • 
dictates on national economic size, but also with some regard to economic 
sophistication. Small, rich countries, especially those in Europe with ready 
access to large markets (such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) 
sometimes export scale economy products whereas bigger but.less affluent 
countries infrequently specialize in these goods (Japan (at that time), Mexico 
and India)" (p.181).^^^
Keesing set out to investigate the hypothesis that countries with small 
populations experience a comparative disadvantage in many important 
manufacturing industries, uncompensated by *a comparative advantage in others 
His regression results strongly confirmed the hypothesis. But, "The regression 
method is also likely to yield deceptive results when small countries are 
overcoming scale barriers.through specialization.
12/
13/
14/
J. Dreze, "Quelques réflexions sereines sur l’adaptation de 1’ industrie belge au Marché Commun" Comptes rendus des Trg^aux de la Société Royale 
d' Economie Politique de Belgique. Dec. 1960.
G.C. Hufbauer: The Impact of National Characteristics and Technology on 
the Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactured Goods; in R. Vernon (ed.) 
The Technology Factor in International Trade N.B.E.R. 1970.
D.B. Keesing "Population and Industrial Development: Some Evidence from 
Trade Patterns" A.E.R. June 1958.
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Second, the introduction of économies to scale into the picture, has profound
implication for the equilibrium of the firm. As Sraffa first pointed out,
15/perfect competition ceases to be operative. • In order to have equilibrium,
demand elasticities must be less than infinite. The economics of imperfect
16 / . . .  competition comes to the fore.'"' Different demand and technological conditions
plus differences in managerial ability combine to give a variety of firm sizes
' 17 /even within the same branch of industry.
It seems appropriate to discuss here the market structure of Greek industry.
' • po /Prof. Zolotas called it "imperfect polypoly" in 1978. ' It means the
simultaneous existence of a few large firms and a great many small ones with 
large differential profits whithin each sector. The latter characteristic 
shows■the existence of imperfect competition.
15/
16/
17/
P. Sraffa "The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions" Economic Journal 1926.
J. Robinson "The Economics of Imperfect Competition" Cambridge 19 33 and E. H. Chamberlin "The Theory of Monopolistic Competition." Cambridge 
Mass. 1933.
An excellent survey of the Theory of the Firm (Static and Dynamic) 
is given by R. Marris and D.C. Mueller "The Corporation, Competition 
and the Invisible Hand" Journal of Econ. Literature March 1980,
I thought at first that he was introducing a neologism. I later 
discovered that F. Machlup had first used this term ("Monopoly and 
Competition: A Classification of Market Positions" A.E.R. 1937)
The term, meaning "many sellers" should be rendered in English as 
'polypoleion."
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As a rules industrialization in a small country behind high tariff walls
creates a situation where "the ensuing market structure is one in which
the number of firms is large, the scale of firm is sub-optimal and average
costs are high. Thus, the high price- tends to be justified in terms of high
costs by the market structure which it produces. In the case where economies
of scale.place insuperable barriers to entry, firms tend to be of the
19 /optimum size and high prices make for permanently high profits."
For the Greek case, Ellis’ implicit modei is that of Price Leadership, with
•• 20 /X-inefficiency on the part of large units. In other words, large units
set a high price (being protected by tariffs) and "live-and-let-live".
Variations in X-inefficiency account for differential profits among large
units. This model seems adequate as short-run analysis. But it fails to take
21/into account free entry and its effects in the long-run.
Dr. Athanassiou offers a more elaborate and representative model of the
22/peculiarities of Greek market. ' According to standard theory, large number 
of producers, homogeneity of product and free entry to the market should lead 
in the end to zero profits. After discussing certain peculiarities of greek
20/
S. Stykolt and H.C. Eastman "A Model for the Study of Protected Oligopolies" 
A.E.R. June 1960. They refer to the Canadian experience,
H.S. Ellis et alii: "Industrial Capital in Greek Development" KEPE Athens
1964, Chapter VII.  ^ / _ ' : :   ... :On X-efficiency', H. Leibenstein: Allocative Efficiency vs. X-efficiency A.E.R. June 1956. ,
On Price Leadership G.J. Stigler: The Kinky • Oligopoly Demand Curve J. of Pol. Econ. 1947.
21/ J.S. Bain "Conditions of Entry and the Emergence of Monopoly" in E.H.
Chamberlin (ed.). "Monopoly and Competition and their Regulation", London, McMillan 19 54; idem. Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University Press 1956)
22/ L. Athanassiou: Income Distribution in Greece; Discussion Paper, KEPE, Athens, 
January 1981, Chapter II (in Greek)
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markets (such..as-imperfect financialmarkets, non-homogeneous products, 
existence-of "sellers’ markets", inefficient retail trade, the reluctance 
of large enterpreneurs to extinguish their small corapetitors^^^) none of 
which being in his analysis, strong- enough to invalidate the tendency to 
zero profits, he supports that "It seems that the Greek seller tries hard • 
to treat each buyer according to (buyer’s) circumstances, character and 
psychology aiming at high profits on the principle of price differentiation."
Price differentiation which rests upon 'the time-honoured (Middle-Eastern) 
practice of bargafntng enhanced by non-homogeneous products and the 
mutual distrust among Greeks. So a seller is able to "extract" a high price 
for his product persuading his customer that his competitor is not very 
reliable (in terms of quality, delivery or other selling conditions).
As a result, the information gathering process which is a precondition 
of the smooth working of perfect competition becomes in Greece an extremely 
expensive and time consuming activity.
In terms of standard theory, the Average Revenue curve (AR) which should 
have been perfectly elastic, bends downwards as each seller tries to catch 
a larger share of the market by reducing his price. In the short-run (for 
given cost curves) equilibrium for each seller depends on his ability to 
bargain. In the long-run, ideally.the market should reach a position of
2 3/ This attitude is partly due to large expansion of domestic market up 
to 1973 and partly to deeply entrenched family control of the firm 
which blocks the otherwise smooth evolution of a firm.
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equilibrium where downwards sloping AR curve is tangent to AC curve^hamberlin's
equilibrium/ This does not happen however because the element of risk is so high
23/ 24/that constant inflow-outflow.of units perpetuates market disequilibrium.
It seems to me that Dr. Athanassioti’s model approximates Greek reality close enough. 
It takes into account the particular trading practices of Greek people and it offers 
a-good explanation both of the excess capacity that is observed in small units and 
of'the wide dispersion of pfofit-margins within small-scale sector. T6 make it’a 
fully operational long-run model, one should turn it into a stochastic model by 
estimating chances of survival for the individual firm.
It seems to me that market conditions in Greece in the 1960's are better represented 
by a combination,of both Ellis’ and Athanassiou’s models. That is under the umbrella 
of X-inefficient large firms, small firms, behaved according to.Athanassiou model. 
Introducing freer foreign trade would force the large firms either to become more 
efficient or to vanish while small firms as a sector might be still viable. Long-run 
adjustment to the rules of perfect competition (namely the reduction, in information 
costs) depends largely on the speed by which small enterpreneurs adopt "western" 
practices.
So far, our analysis has avoided the problem of differences in technology. In real 
world, such differences exist both inter- and .intra- country. What this implies for 
small and large manufacturing sectors?
23/ Entry is kept at a high rate because new entrants are lured by high profits that 
certain (however few) established enterpreneurs enjoy under this, market nexus.
24/ "It has been observed..that among the properties of many societies whose economic 
development is backward is a lack of mutual trust" K.J. Arrow: The Limits.of Organization W.N. Norton 1974 p.26.
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It mainly implies that the situation of small industry in a developed
country is quite different from that in an underdeveloped one.
"The forms of small industry found in the highly industrialized economy
are very different, .... , from those in traditional economies. Most small
factories in the United States are modern in the sense that they use
reasonably up-to-date tools, equipment and methods, ... , the percentage
of manufacturing output produced by small manufacturing establishments
in the United States is not much less than their percentage of manufacturing
employment (23 against 27). In other words, the average productivity of
2 5/workers in small factories is not far below that in large."
By contrast "...the great majority of small scale manufacturers in the 
(underdeveloped) countries have backward technology, inefficient management 
and low productivity. .  ■
An additional difference is that small scale industry is transformed, as 
modernization goes forward, from a competitor with large units to a supplementer 
of them. For a small country trying to get industrialized under a liberal 
system of trade, the question arises whether more trade will speed up
(1) the efficiency of small units and (2) their integration with large units 
(both at home and abroad) or will lead to‘a drastic shrinkage of their 
importance.’-'
E. Staley and R. Morse "Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries" 
. /McGraw-Ril^L 19Ô5, pp. 16-7 - -  r. ,   ■ -
ibid, p.11.
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II. ECONOMIC POLICY ASPECTS
Economic policy should aim at full employment, efficient resource allocation, 
sufficient economic growth arid "just" income distribution. Leaving aside 
income distribution considerations, the problem of small-scale industry 
presents the following particular aspects.
First, for a country with structural unemployment, small units offer a source
of employment however inefficiently labour (and other resources) is used in
this sector. So there is a trade-off between efficiency and full employment
Within the area of. resource allocation, there is the dilemma that "efficiency
27/requires fewer units of larger size, and competition requires many units".
For an economy in transition the'main problem is to transform a rather' 
stagnant sector into a growing dynamic sector. There is the additional 
problem of integrating a sector which is technologically backward with an 
advanced sector (usually consisting of a few large units).
Concerning Greece in early 1960*s, we can quote Prof. Koutsoumaris 
"More specifically, any governmental program in this connection must focus 
primarily upon measures that, would assist and induce small firms to:
(1) gain easy access to financial facilities at reasonable terms;
(2) raise their production and technological standards; and (3) enlarge
2S/their market outlets for the products".
We shall examine how actual Greek policy was materialized in Chapter VI 
and sketchly evaluation of this is attempted in Chapter VII.
S. StyKolt and H.C. Eastman; op.cit. p. 347.
28/ G. Koutsoumaris: The Morphology of Greek Industry. KEPE, 1953; p.358
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CHAPTER,III.
SMALL AND LARGE ENTERPRISES IN GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
I. Salient Features
A notable feature of the Greek manufacturing sector is its "dual economy" 
nature. A very large number of small enterprises co-exist with a few large 
ones. On the basis of 1973 Census of ..Industry there were 121,357 industrial 
establishments employing 604,041 persons. About two-thirds of these establishments 
(numbering about.81,000) had average annual employment no more than 2 persons 
and accounted for only about one-fifth of total employment. Establishments 
employing 3 or more persons accounted approximately for 500,000 persons employed. 
At the other end of the spectrum 70 big firms employed more than 500 persons 
eact, and this accounted for about 11.6 per cent of total employment.
.The skewed distribution of enterprise size is obvious from those figures.
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The latest census (1978) showed the following distribution of establishments 
and employment.
TABLE III.l
Structure of Greek Manufacturing Industry in 1978
Size Class Number of Number of Rate of Change 
1963/1978(persons employed) Establishments % Persons Employed % Establishments Employment
0-2 88,993 69,0 123,070 18,6 -0.5 “1.7
3-9 . 31,328 24,3 141,070 21,0 0.9 -1.2
10-49 7,139 ' 5,5 139,174 20,3 2.0 0
50-499 1,443 1,1 186,250 27,6 3.1 1.6
500 and over 85 0,1 81,933 12,5 6.3 2.3
Total 128,988 100,0 671,497 100,0
Source : N.S.S.G. • Census of Industry 1978 •
There is, first, the problem of defining, each size-class. There can be a variety 
of criteria such as sales per (either fixed or total) assets; assets per employed 
person; absolute turnover; absolute level of (either fixed or total) assets and 
number of workers. Availability of data constrains us to define small enterprises 
as those employing 1-9 persons while large enterprises as those employing 10 
persons or over per year.
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"With respect to size classification of industrial establishments, we agree
with Sargant Florence that the "least objectionable" of the generally
1/available measures is that by number of employees." These definitions
. .are kept throughout the rest of the thesis.
Comparison with some other European countries may be of interest. In Greece
the enterprises employing 1-9 persons accounted for 42.2 per cent of total
employment in 1973. By comparison, in the United Kingdom, the establishments
employing 1-10 persons accounted for only 2 per cent of the labour force in
1968.^^ In the European Economic Community (of the original six members)
3/the..corresponding figure for 1963 was 15 per cent. In Norway the establishments
employing 1-10 persons accounted for 13 per cent of manufacturing employment.
• • * H / • ■Ane even in Japan, which is supposed to have a "dual economy", the establishments
with 1-10 persons accounted for only 17 per cent of total manufacturing
5/ ■employment (1970 figures). . . .
1/
2/
3/
4/
5/
E. Staley and R. Morse: Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries ; McGraw-Hill 1955 p.14. P. Sargant Florence: Investment, Location and Size of Plant; Cambridge University Press, 1948.
J.S. Prais: "The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain"
Cambridge University Press 1976, pp.10-13.
ibid, p.159
S. Breadline: Industrial Dualism in Japan; London, 1966 
Japanese MITI Census of Manufacture, 1970
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II. Productivity and Technology
The question to be examined first is how concentrated each size-class is and 
how comfortable they are between themselves. This done for a rough measure of 
the extent of specialization within and between the two size-classes. So, the 
measure of concentration shows, over a number of years, the trend towards 
greater or less specialization among production sectors while the measure of 
conformability shows the divergent or convergent pattern of production between 
the sectors of the two size-classes.
As measure of concentration among sectors, the standard deviation of employment 
6/is used. This measure, for each size-class, was calculated from the Annual 
'Surveys'of Greek Industry for the Years 1963, 1969, 1970 and 1975 for all 20 
sectors. The F distribution is used when testing hypotheses about the differences 
of two variances. The hypothesis tested is usually of the form:
2 2 Ho = = Gg
2 2where and are the variances of two populations. The statistic:
S ^
-  1 ■ •F =
with (n^-1) and (h^-l) degrees of freedom (thereafter d.f.) is used to test
7 /the null hypothesis. Table III.l contains the relevant calculations.
6/ Sectors are defined by National Statistical Service of Greece (N.S.S.G) 
following the I.S.I.C. (Appendix I).
7/ W.L. Merrill and K.A. Fox: Introduction to Economical Statistics;
■ John Wiley and Sons, 1970, p.302.
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TABLE III.2
Standard Deviation of Employment in Small and Large Manufacturing Classes
Year Small-Scale Industry Large-Scale Industry F-Statistic
1963 16,046 . 9,868 ‘ 2.6442*
1969 15,149 97598 2.4914*
1970 14,044 10,565 1.7669
1975 13,703 ‘ 14,590 . 0,8821
asterisks indicate significance at a =.05
Source ;: Annual Surveys of Greek Industry 1963, 1969, 1970, 1975.National Statistical Service of Greece (N.S.S.G.)
As shown in Table III.l, there is a trend for decreasing concentration in small- 
scale industry while large-scale industry shows increasing specialization.
2 2As a result, for 1970 and 1975, the hypothesis is accepted.
As for the conformability between the same sectors of the two size-classes, the
8 /simple correlation coefficient was taken as the relevant statistic. If r is 
close to plus one the respective sectors vary in the same direction; if r is 
close to minus one the respective sectors vary in the opposite direction, i.e., 
large sector for the large-scale class entails small sector for the small-scale 
class. If r is close to zero or in other words, the null Hypothesis (p=0)
8/ Rank correlation (Spearman’s statistic) could .-have been used ag well. G.W.Snedecor 
rejects this measure because ’’There is little justification for such a procedure" 
Statistical Methods Iowa State University Press 1962 p.191.
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is accepted, no co-variation exists. Table III.2 presents the relevant 
coefficients.
TABLE-111.3
Correlation Coefficient between Sector Employment in the two Size-classes 
of Greek Industry
Year . 1953 1969 1970 1975 .
r .3949 .4963" .4951^ .5994"
Notes: * Asterisk shows significance at 5%
With 18 d.f. the critical value of significance for correlation coefficient
9/at 5% is .444 and at 1% is .551. Only 1963 does it fail to pass’, this 
criterion. It is safe therefore to conclude that the two size-classes show 
positive co-variation from late 1960's onwards; this covariation is increasing 
over time. To test whether p. - p = 0 where p = 1  we apply the Z trans­
formation :
2 ^e\ 1-r ^
2which is normally distributed with variance: a
Z= -i log '
Z n-3
and supply the usual t-difference of means test.
9/ Snedecor, op.cit.. Table 7.6.1, p.174
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The corresponding t's are: =13.4268 ^(1970)= 13.4322 and t^^g.^^^=12.8181
Therefore the difference between absolute positive co-variation and the 
existing situation is significant. Therefore, we may conclude that although . 
small-scale industry sectors tend to be large where the respective large-scale 
industry sectors are large, there are notable exceptions: namely 
a) Basic Metal industries, b) Petroleum refining and c) Tobacco manufactures, 
where small industry is virtually non-existent and d) Furniture, e) Wood and 
Cork industry and f) Miscellaneous industries where small-scale industry is 
preponderant.
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The small and large enterprises in Greece differ in terms of their factor 
intensities, profitability and Value Added per person. In 1973, the Value 
Added per person was 54,000'drs in the small enterprises and 150,000 drs. 
in the large enterprises.
The enterprises differ also in their pattern of capital expenditure: for
example, a study by C. Nicolaou showed that in 1969 small enterprises
accounted for 43 per cent of total capital stock in buildings (because
small-scale enterpreneurs declare their personal domiciles as places of
their industrial activity) but only 24 per cent of the total stock in 
• 10/machinery; moreover, the machinery capital per person employed was three 
times higher in the large enterprises than in the small ones.
lQ7 C. Nicolaou: Analysis of Fixed Capital etc. (op.cit.) as quoted in 
"Viotechnia" (op.cit.)
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These, of course, are aggregate figures and do not show whether the small and 
large enterprises differ within particular industries. In order to explore • 
whether the production techniques of small and large enterprises differ 
within industries, I regressed their Capital/Labour intensities and also 
their Capital/Output ratios. Capital is defined as machinery and output as 
Value Added. The data are for year 1969. The regression results are: ,
(2) (~) = 55.4861 + .0247 f.^ j
(3)
^ (4.3085) (.7919) ^
r = .1835 (non-significant at 5%)
- 20 observations -
/K^ _ -.1344 t 2.5232(K/0)l
\0/g ,(-.0755) (1.6169)
r = ,3561 (non-significant at 5%)
- 20 observations -
where /K
S(~j = Capital/Labour intensity in small enterprises '/g
/KS = Capital/Labour intensity in large enterprises 
= Capital/Output ratio in small enterprises
= Capital/Output ratio in large enterprises
t-ratioa in parentheses
Note: For 18 d.f. the correlation coefficient is significant at 5% 
when p =.444 and over.
(Table 7.6.1 p.174 in Snedecor, op.cit.)
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The insignificant correlation coefficients show that enterprises in the two 
size-classes have rather different production techniques even within the 
same industries,
Since for three sectors (Tobacco (22), Petroleum (32) and Basic Metal (34) ) 
small-scale industry is virtually non-existent, it is of some interest 
to see'how the same regression fare without these sectors. The results are 
reported in regressions (2)’ and (3)’.
(2)« (k) =45.4160 t .0072 (K/L)?
y v  ^(4.7212) (.0887)
r =.0229 non-significant at 5%
17 observations
(3)' fK^ _ .8809 + .3315/k) '
(3.5404) (1.1869) '
r .2930 non-significant at 5%
17 observations
The results are equally poor, showing that there is no correspondence of 
techniques or productivity among the same branches of the two size-classes; 
although, as a rule, small-scale industry is concentrated in low Capital/Labour 
intensity sectors (Regression (1)).
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Regressions (3) and (3)' may be taken as indicating that there is wide
difference in the use of capital within the same sector at the level of
two size-classes. Taking the’'difference of Capital/Output ratios we note
that in seven sectors, small-scale industry has lower Capital/Output ratio
(i.e., higher capital productivity). These seven sectors are 1) Beverage (21);
2) Footwear and sewing of cloth (24); 3) Paper manufacture (27); Petroleum
refining (32); 5) Non metallic mineral products (33); 6) Fabricated metal
products except machinery (35); and 7) Electrical machinery (37).
Careful scrutiny shows, however, that, except for the first two (21) and
(24), there is product differentiation between size-classes. For example
paper manufacture industry is capital intensive but under the same heading
(27) small scale industry is concentrated in the three-digit sector 272
(i.e.7 Articles of paper and paperboard). There is, therefore, aggregation
12/bias which distorts the respective capital/output ratios.
12/ For branch (32) small-scale industry is rather auxiliary to large-scale 
homologue. For (31) Non-metallic mineral products, small-scale industry 
is concentrate to Pottery and Ceramics (333), Products of Cement (336) 
but not to manufacturing of cement (334) which is capital intensive 
sector dominated by 5 large units) and marble processing (337). For 
35 metal products except machinery, small scale industry is, passim, 
concentrated in low capital intensive sectors such as Building 
materials of metal (353) and Plumbing Fixtures (355) while for 
Electrical appliances (37) the small scale units are mainly repair 
shops.
As a last step, I regressed the profit margins of the small and large 
enterprises. This is done as an attempt to explore the relative market 
'• performance .of the two size-classes. The margin is defined as
n - V«A.-L.R.
. G.P.V.
where ' II = Profit margin; V.A. = Value Added
L.R, = Labour Remuneration; G.P.V.= Gross Product Value
The'data for labour remuneration contains an estimate of the remuneration 
of self-employed. This was estimated by multiplying the average wage in 
each industry sector by the corresponding number of self-employed.
The regression results (for 1969) are;
(4) Hg = 40.3208 -1.5472'n^
. (1.3809) (-1.3776)
r = -.3088 not significant at 5% , .
20 observations
And excluding the three aforementioned sectors
• . ■ ■ ■ ' ^  -
(4)' Hg = 5.0893 + .1189 '
(.5002) (.3048)
r = .0785 not significant at 5%
17 observations
This poor fitting could be because II’s do not allow for capital costs; 
so I tried to see whether including some measure of capital intensity . 
could explain the poor correlation.
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(5) (n - n )= -19.1991 + .0343 f /K\ /
s  ^ s ~\L(-2.5942) (1.7650)
r= .3841 not significant at 5%
20 observations
(5)' (n^ - n )= -13.1709 + .0788/'/k\ '(k \ 1
(-4.8714) (2.4879)*
r= .5405 * = significant at 5%
(17 observations)
The fitting is almost successful in (5) and very successful in (5)' 
This suggests that there possibly exists a correlation between
V.A. - L.R. - Cap. Cost 
G.P.V.
for the small and large enterprises were it possible to estimate the 
relevant Capital Costs for each sector.
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III. Subcontracting
So far we have assumed that small and large sectors of Greek manufacturing
industry are rather competitive. But as Staley and Morse note: "It is a
mistake to think of small industry and large industry as antagonists, in
the sense that one tends to wipe out the other. There are both competitive
and complementary aspects in their relations" (op.cit. p.273), As a proper
13 /measure of this relationship, the level of subcontracting is taken.
The aforementioned report by KEPE (VIOTECHNIA) suggests two ratios for.the 
measurement, of intrabranch cooperation (p.90). Namely (i) Payments for contract 
work over Gross Product value and.(ii) Payment for contract work over receipts 
from contract work. The first ratio intends to measure the extent to which 
subcontracting takes place while the second can be taken as an indication 
of the source of subcontracting (i.e. is it commerce or industry?)
From the Annual Industrial Surveys, I constructed the relevant ratios for 
the years 1953, 1970 and 1975. Since we are interested in the extent to 
which large industry employs small scale industry, I give the two ratios 
for the size-class employing 10 persons and over.
13 / S. WC|tanabe analyses the mutual advantages that subcontracting confers 
to both sectors of the industry. "Subcontracting, Industrialization and 
and Employment creation" International Labour Review. July-August 1971
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TABLE III.3
Subcontracting Ratios in Greek Large-scale Industry
1 1953 1970 197 5
■ Sector 1 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
20 0,07 6,74 0,11 12,75 0,17 25,66
21 - 2,01 0,32 71,53 0,25 53,34.
22 0,05 28,72 0,27 349,90 0,52 74,25
23 4,50 68,56 4,51 * 63,54 5,86 78,29
24 2,05 50,47 3,02 54,87 5,29 65,09
25 0,23 ■ 13,70 0,24 50,29 0,17 147,66
26 2,41 - 1071,09 1,86 455,18 1,57 1249,49
27 0,36 75,58 0,28 31,61 0,27 116,27
28 6,28 20,67 5,07 15,26 5,96 .22,64
29 1,33 126,22 2,01 92,20 2,10 46,45
30 0,47 57; 09 0,71 148,38 0,72 136,05
- 31 0,39 67,98 0,24 32,03 0,42 49,42
32 - - - - -
33 0,52 21,04 0,68 3.3,87 0,40 42,80
34 0,66 141,87 0,09 61,27 1 0,97 86,28
35 0,62 19,45 1 0,75 29,31 1,64 84,60
36 1,39 22,32 1,83 778,58 1 2,40 96,96
37 1,19 210,04 1 0,45 66,22 1 0,71 68,42
38 1,66 102,85 1,73 664,52 2,76 3357,24
39 0,41 58,47 . 1,35 63,92 1,68 134,38
All .-industry
1
1,34 46,23 1,21 47,04 1,70 61,66
NOTE: Ratio (1): Payments for subcontracting work over Gross Product Value
Ratio (2): Payments for subcontracting work over Receipts from contract work.
SOURCE; Annual Industrial Surveys 1963, 1970, 1975 (NSSG)
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Ratio (1) is deceptively low in most cases (except for textiles (23) and 
Printing (28)). Ratio (2) (except for Furniture (25) and Transport (38.)) 
shows that "subcontracting iQ Greece does not have the character of 
intrabranch relationship but its source must lie with commerce rather 
than with industry" (KEPE report, p.90).
If we examine the trends in Ratio (1), we infer that there is a clear 
tendency for subcontracting to increase in 9 sectors (20, 22, 23, 24, 29,
35, 36, 38, 39), to fall in two sectors (25, 26) while 8 sectors experienced 
reversals (21, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37). For sector 32 subcontracting 
remained non-existent.
It is particularly important to compare the Greek case with the EEC data.
The 1963 European Community Census of Industry does not give data on
subcontracting. The 1975 Census does with the restriction that it is confined
to units employing 20 persons and over. Happily enough the 1975 Greek
14/Industrial Survey provides us with data for the same size-class.' ’
14/ As Gross Product Value, Code 68 variable (Production value excl. V.A.T.) 
was taken. Code 44 variable (cost of industrial services received from 
other organizations) was taken as Payments for Subcontracting and Code 
20 variable (Revenue from industrial services rendered to others) as 
Receipts from subcontracting.
Structure and Activity of Industry. Methods and definitions ' Eurost.a-t 1978,
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France is excluded because data on subcontracting are not available. 
Ireland is excluded because she did not participate in the Census and 
Luxembourg is not included because, most manufacturing branches are 
missing. The corresponding ratios (1) and (2) are given in Table III.4.
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Ratio (1) reveals that subcontracting is more extensive in all European 
countries than in Greece. For comparison reasons I divided every EEC-member 
Ratio (1) by the corresponding Greek ratio to measure how many times 
subcontracting is larger in the former countries (Table III.5).
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TABLE III.5
RELATIVE SUBCONTRACTING;RATIO (1)
ISIC GERMANY ITALY ITHE NETHERLANDS
1
BELGIUM U.K. j DENMARK 1 GREECE
• K
20 8.06 .5.06 1.81 8.94 7.13
(
j 9.81 1- 1
21 12.71 3.82 5.82 14.88 8.35 ! 12.59 1 1
22 0.60 1.29 5.17 2.63 0.75 i 0.83 1 i 1
23 1.15 1.79 .99 .84 0.76 i 0.61 j 1
24 1.38 1.04 2.48 1.14 0.64 0.591 I 1
25 24.19 12.38 35.88 27.19 17.06 i 17.13 1 1
26 0.95 1.33 1.63 2.13 2.01 I 1.35 I 1
27 10.31 7.04 1.92 10.38 7.12 ! 12.08 1 1!
. 28 0.73 1.97 2.53 1.73 1.34 1 0.52 I ^
j 29 0.97 • 1.62 1.33 0.70 0.85 1.26 j ^
J.30 2.91 3.00 2.06 3.06 2.97 j 4.16 ! 1
f 31 7.93 6.46 1.20 10.73 5.78 i ■ 7.07 1 1
1 32 - . - - -
1 33 15.12 11.03 5.06 11.52 . 6.00 18.82 : 1V-! 34 3.42 4.95 1.85 4.81 2.51 4.73 !1 1
I 35 2.58 3.24 • 4.93 3.95 2.23 2.19 ' 1
j. 35 1.30 1.92 2.11 1.08 1.65 1.42 1
! 37 2.85 3.69 0.35 3.14 3.40 4.11 1
j 38 0.98 1.26 6.85 ' 0.77 1.36 1.24 1
! 39 1 1.50 1.94 -■ 1.27 1.28 1.63 1
|aii
Industry 2.37 2.47 2.11 1.63 1.62 1
■[ * ..k
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The All Industry ratio varies from 1.62 times in the case of Denmark to 
2.47 times in the case of the Netherlands. Moreover, in all six cases the 
difference of the two means is statistically significant.
Ratio (2) reveals that in the case of Greece, large industry is
reluctant to receive orders for subcontracting. That is why extreme 
values for ratio (2) are observed. ' ' . '
So it is safe to conclude that the intra-industry relations have not yet 
developed to such a level that the "tvto size-classes can be considered 
complementary rather than competitive.
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IV. Capital Immobility and the Co-existence of Small and. Large enterprises;
The picture that emerges from the above regression results is in line 
with the generally held view of a ”du'al economy" where small units 
co-exist with large ones in almost all of the manufacturing industries. 
The question, now, is what makes this co-existence possible. Three 
explanations seem plausible ;
[a] There may be tacit agreement on the separation of the
market, whereby small enterprises confine themselves to 
produce certain items that are not produced by large 
enterprises.
tb) • A second explanation may lie in the desire of the typical 
greek entrepreneur to be his own "boss", even if that
involves receiving a smaller income than could be earned
"d5as a salaried employee “ . A related point is that tax 
avoidance may be easier for self-employed people, the 
"boss" of a small enterprise may have a higher disposable 
income than the salaried employee.
I
Cc3 The most likely explanation, however, may be the nature
of the financial markets in Greece. There is virtually 
no capital market [Stock Exchange) for the financing,of
"The esprit de corps and interest in the fortunes of the firm, 
which animate the workpeople in establishments where the 
personal Intercourse of employers and employed is cordial 
besides leading to increased production of wealth is, in 
itself, an addition to welfare”, A.C, Pigou: The Economics
of Welfare, 4th Edition, p.16.
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16:industry . Large industrial enterprises must rely 
either upon their own resources (namely retained profits
itand depreciation allowances) or upon the banks , Small
firms find great difficulty in obtaining bank loans.
Thus, being exclusively family concerns, they have to
rely on proprietor(s)’ personal fortune and, in certain
18cases, on their relatives’ savings' .
The point that banks do not, as a rule, encourage small enterprises 
is illustrated by the following table ;
TABLE II.1
INDUSTRIAL LOANS BY COMMERCIAL BANKING UP TO 31.12.1975 (IN '000 MILLION DRS)
Type of Loan Large Enterprises Small Enterprises Total Percentag!
(1) (2) (1) + (2)=3 (2 : 3)
Letters of 
Credit 14,3 4,2 18,5 22.7
Current Capital 59,3 8,2 67,5 12.1
Fixed Capital 41,6 . 1,6 33,2 4.8
Total 105,2 14,0 119,2 11.7
Source : Bank of Greece
16 For instance, operations on industrial shares amounted to 105,4 million 
drs. in 1960 and only to 142,3 million drs. in 1967. E.A. Kartakis :
Le Development Industriel de la Grece; Centre de Recherches’ Européennes 
Lausanne, 1970, p.133 (in French only)
17 G.F. Koutsoumaris: Financing and Development of Industry; Institute
of Economic and Industrial Research, Athens 1976, p.159 (in Greek only)
18 As pointed out in the study by H.S. Ellis, D.D. Psilos, R.M, Westebbe 
and K, Nicolaou (The Industrial Capital in the Development of Greek 
Economy; Centre of Planning and Economic Research, Athens 1965)
../Cont’d.
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The table shows that small enterprises accounted for only 4.8 per 
cent of total industrial loans- for fixed capital. We may compare this 
with the fact that in 1969 (the only available data) small enterprises 
accounted for 28.4 per cent of fixed industrial capital. The very large 
discrepancy between these two ratios, indicates that small enterprises 
are poorly served by bank loans.
The sum up, the evidence presented above corroborates the widely held 
view of a dual structure in greek manufacturing and suggests that one 
reason for this may be the nature of the capital market in Greece.
18 (cont'd)
The greek law favours the establishment of small family firms, but 
at the same time discourages external financing because of the 
insufficient control it provides for the lender (p.76 of the Greek 
edition).
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CHAPTER IV ,
EMPIRICAL RESULTS I; RELATIVE GROVITH OF SMALL AMD 
LARGE ENTERPRISES IN GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
The main target of our empirical analysis is to test whether or not 
trade liberalization induced a relative shrinkage in the sector, of 
small enterprises relative to the large enterprises. The basic sample 
of my analysis includes 53 three-digit sectors. In selecting this 
sample, an effort was made for the sample to be as comprehensive as 
possible. Two constraining factors limited the choice. First, in some 
sectors small-scale enterprises were not significant relative to 
large enterprises. Second, the three-digit sectors should correspond 
to foreign trade categories as neatly defined as possible. The sample 
as such includes 53 sectors out of 77 and covers approximately 70 per
cent, of all industry's total output. 1 /
The model used here is quite straightforward. Foreign competition 
(increased imports) is assumed to act negatively on the growth of 
each size-class. Reasons can be given either for relatively greater 
impact on the large sector or on the small sector. Namely that.small 
industry's products are more exposed to foreign competition because 
the productive infrastructure of this sector is relatively backward 
while the large-scale sector can resist foreign competition better.
On the other hand, one can argue that small-scale industry is relatively 
sheltered from foreign competition, not producing close substitutes to
1/ Details about the sample are given in Appendices II, III and IV,
The data are reproduced in Appendix V,
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foreign products; while.large-scale industry is more exposed to 
foreign competition since it produces close substitutes.:/:
Which of 'the two views prevail is a questio facti.
Export drive will help firms of either size-class to expand. It is 
therefore assumed to have a positive effect on the growth of each 
size-class. A third explanatory variable is used as well. As the 
small and large enterprises are likely to. differ in their factor 
intensities, it is possible that our foreign trade measures may 
pick up the influence of the factor proportions underlying the 
production techniques. It, . .therefore, seemed desirable to introduce 
the labourrskill intensities as a further variable.
The skill intensities were calculated as the percentage of salaried
2 1employees to total remunerated personnel. ' As the skill intensities 
are likely to show some change over time, I decided to use
2/ "For a proper measurement of the labour skills factor, data on 
number of professionals, craftsmen and kindred workers on an 
industry basis is required. In the absence of such data the 
present measure is offered as a proxy measure for labour skills."
. S.E. Kontos: An Industry Characteristics Analysis of the Trade 
Performance of Major Greek Industries vis-a-vis the EEC; KEPE, 
Athens 1976, Mimeographed p.34.
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a jalternatively the coefficients for 1963 and 1970. ' As B, Gold 
notes, however, "pervasive experience suggests that it is much 
more common for salary staff to be expanded more rapidly than major 
additions to capacity, in order to cope with the increasingly complex 
problems of production, planning, coordination and control".
Our skill index, therefore, can be construed as a scale economies 
index as well. It is believed that the above index will be positive 
for large enterprises and either insignificant or negative for 
the small enterprises.
Two dependent variables are used: G g and Gj^ .
Gg measures the growth of small enterprises and is defined as:
■ ■ Gg= °S70
^863
where Gross Product Value of small enterprises in 1970,
G,
Co
863 = Gross Product Value of small enterprises in 1963.
rrespondingly, G^ is defined as:
°L63
3/ For the year 1970 (when relative data are available) the overall
skill intensity, as defined above, was as follows:
Small enterprises Large enterprises 
All industry .1297 ,2171
Sample .1178 .1964
4/' Bela Gold: Changing Perspectives on Size, Scale and Returns; 
Journal of Economic Literature (March 1981), p,11.
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where = Gross Product value of large enterprises in 1970,
^L63 “ Gross Product value of large enterprises in 1963,
The change ‘in import intensity between the two years is defined as
X -
M " V___ M__
Gm t M 70 63
DM =
where G,p = Total Gross Product Value 
M = Value of competing imports
The change in the export intensity is defined as
DX = 'X ,1
s ^t J70
X
k ^T. 63
where X stands for exports,
N.B. All values have been deflated to 1963 values. The deflators 
were taken from the National accounts of Greece No, 23,
Ministry of Co-ordination, Athens 1976,
The correlation matrix between the explanatory variables is given in 
Table IV.1, Except for the skill intensity variables, the other 
variables are not■significantly correlated at 5 per cent level of 
significance. Thus, there is no fear of multicollinearity in the 
regressions to be run.
The multiple regression results are shown in Table IV.2, The regressions 
aiming to explain the growth of small-scale industry fare badly:
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y ■ all regression coefficients are insignificant. regressand 
fares better. F-statistic is significant and the regression 
> coefficient for DM is strongly significant. The coefficients for
DX and SK variables are insignificant though rightly signed. The 
, conclusion to be drawn points towards the view that the burden of 
foreign competition is borne", mainly by the large sector while the 
small sector is sheltered.
Preliminary tests showed a rather strong relationship between 
numbers of enterprises and their shares; there is an explanation, 
i.e., foreign competition may affect the numbers of enterprises in 
the two size-classes. An effort was made to estimate the effect of 
the same independent variables on the.growth of numbers of large- 
and small-industry respectively. The following regressands were 
estimated;
•>T,
^S70
where ^^=number of establishments in
small-scale industry in the 
. . . . . . .  respective year.
*70 TvTMy =   %(L)(i)=number of establishments inNL63 large-scale industry in the
. . , . . respective year.
The (results of regressions are reported in Table IV,3. The results
indicate that foreign competition had a positive impact on the number
of small-scale industry while negative on the number of large-scale 
industry.
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As a further step, I tried to estimate the impact of foreign, 
competition on the growth of average size of each size class,
^ . It can, already, be surmised from Tables IV.2 and IV.3 that
foreign competition has negative or no impact on the average size 
 ^ of small scale industry while positive on the average size of
large enterprises.
This time, the regressands chosen are,
GS70 
^870
and g-
^S63 
®S63
^L70
®L70
°L63 
«L63
while the regressors are the same as before. The results are 
reported in Table IV,4^.
The results show that for both size-classes foreign competition 
influenced average size negatively. This was expected in the case 
of small enterprises. It seems that the negative impact on numbers 
of large-scale sector was weaker than the similar impact on absolute 
size of the size-class.
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The above sample includes an industry, namely Telecommunication
equipment industry, the growth of which during the period 1963-1970
5 /has been quite phenomenal.^ This wag due mainly to heavy foreign 
investment (particularly by the" German firm Siemens) in this sector 
the investment has been almost entirely in the large enterprises 
and the output was mainly for exports.
Since the production and managerial characteristics of foreign 
firms may differ from those of large Greek enterprises, it seemed 
desirable to rerun the above tests without the above mentioned 
industry. The correlation matrix of the independent variables and 
the multiple regressions are shown in Tables IV.1', IV.2', IV.3' and 
IV.4'.
The conclusions do not change at all but the coefficients for the 
large enterprises are smaller in all cases.. It is interesting to 
examine whether the statistical regressions given by our two samples 
(of 53 and 52 observations respectively) are the same or not. In 
other words, we shall examine, whether including the "Telecommunication 
Equipment" industry entails a fundamental (in the statistical sense) 
change in the estimated parameters of our regressions.
5/ Gross Product Value of this industry in 1970 was more than fifty 
..times that in 1963 (at constant 1963 prices) for the large 
enterprises size group,
6/ Exports of the above sector expanded from 210 ths drs. in 1963 
to 79f050 th. drs. in 1970 at current prices.
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The relevant test falls within the boundaries of Covariance 
Analysis,.*^'^ and in the case of just two classes of estimators it is 
the C,how test as modified Ùy F.M. F i s h e r . T h e  technique is quite 
straightforward: We have available m (here just one) additional 
observations and the question is whether they may be considered 
to come from the same population as the first n (here 52) observations. 
(Note that ra (=number of additional observations) is smaller than k 
(the number of parameters)).
We proceed as follows. To the first n observation we fit the least- 
squares. regression:
(a) X^b^ + e^
and compute the residual sum of squares e^e^. We pool the n+ra 
Sample observations to give I and X and fit the least-squares 
regression :
(b) y = Xb t e
computing again the residual sum of squares ee. The test of null 
hypothesis that the m additional observations obey the same relation 
as the first is given by
(c) F  ----  û_
^1?1
(m-k) •
which is distributed as F with (m, n-k) degrees of freedom,
7/ J. Johnston: Econometric Methods, New York, McGraw Hill 1972; 
Second Edition pp. 192-207
8/ G.G, Chow, "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions", Econoraetrica I960 pp. 591-605; and T - l
cont,/
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The estimated values for F are given in Table IV.5-
As shown in Table IV.5, the inclusion of telecommunication 
equipment sector alters the parameters but not the overall results 
in the case of large scale industry in all cases. In the case of 
small scale industry, however, there is no significant alteration 
of the parameters (and henceforth the results) in the first two 
sets of regressions; namely in the case of impact of foreign 
competition on absolute shares and numbers of small industry.
In the case of growth of average size of small enterprise, the 
inclusion of the aforementioned sector entails a "structural" 
change in the parameters of the regressions. Summing up, we 
-conclude that in the case of large enterprises we have two sets 
of regressions while in the case of small enterprises the choice 
is limited to whether we examine the growth of average size or 
not.
8/ (cont.)
F.M. Fisher, "Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients 
in Two Linear Regressions: An Expository Note", Econoraetrica 
1970 pp. 361-366.
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Summary and Conclusions
With the aid of simple-'-multiple regressions we have found 
out that foreign competition (increased imports) affected 
negatively the growth in large enterprises while hot affecting 
the growth of small industry. There is an indication that ' 
foreign competition acted on numbers of enterprises, increasing 
the number of small,ones and diminishing the number of large 
ones. The impact on average size was negative in both cases.
The impact of exports and skill-scale intensities was 
negligible (insignificant). The overall conclusion must 
be that the small sector of Greek industry was rather ■ 
protected .from foreign competition during 1963-1970, while 
large sector suffered the burden of foreign competition.
-  66 -
CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL. RESULTS II : THE ABSOLUTE 
• GROWTH OF SMALL ENTERPRISES
This Chapter investigates further the Implications of foreign competition 
for the small scale enterprises. Whereas the previous Chapter examined 
how foreign competition affected the growth of small enterprises relative 
to the large ones, the purpose now is to examine the effect on the 
absolute growth of small enterprises. From, the viewpoint p f  the 
enterprises themselves, it is the absolute effect that may be of interest.
The technique of analysis used here builds upon a type of market share 
analysis initiated by Chenery for the measurement of "import substitution"^
His aim was to decompose the growth in domestic output due to :
[i] substitution of imports and 
Cii) growth of demand.
2I first outline the procedure by following "P. Desai’s elaboration of 
the Chenery method.
We begin with the identity :
Q = uS (13
where u = ■— ; Q = domestic output j ' S = total supply,
i.e. S = 0 + M where M = imports
1 H. Chenery : Patterns of Industrial Growth, American Economic
Review, September 1960.
2 P. Desai : Alternative Measures of Import substitution, Oxford
Economic Papers 21 [November 19693 pp.312-325.
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Differentiating equation CD, we get :
dQ = du S + u dS
Ql ■ - Q2Let u = —  in the base year and u in the current year. Theni i-i ^
the change in output is given by
dO = UjdS + gu^ - u^jSg C2);
Relationship (2) divides additional domestic output into two categories:
First, u^dS which is the change in domestic output due to the growth in 
domestic demand and secondly, gu^ - which is the change in domestic
output caused by the change in the ratio of domestic output to total supply. 
The latter is Chenery's measure of importXsubstitution.
Chenery's definition of import substitution has been subject to some 
criticisms. First, as Pomfret remarks, "import substitution is a process
and as such has a time dimension, whereas the Chenery measure has no rules
' 3concerning the selection of beginning and end period” . Second, as noted
by C.F. Oiaz-Alejandro, "the typical definition of import substitution,
that used by Chenery..., was devoid of welfare implications. The
proportion of total supply of a particular good obtained from imports
rather than from domestic production can decrease [i.e. import substitution
occurs] either because a tariff is placed on that good, or because
4devaluation makes imports more expensive, or for a number of other reasons" ,
R.W.T. Pomfret : "Trade Policies and Industrialisation in a Small 
Country : the Case of Israel", Kieler Studies 141; J.C.B, Mohr, 
Tübingen, 1976, p.18
C.F. Diaz-Alejandro : Trade Policies and Economic Development in 
P.B. Kenen, ed.. International Trade and Finance; Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, p.130.
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These criticisms, however, do not raise serious problems for the 
present purpose since we are, interested in the growth per se over a 
period of time.
s.
Our analysis of the small enterprises growth builds upon equation (2] 
as follows: We make use of the following identities.
Qg = wQ ' C3)'
where w is the share of small enterprises output to total domestic 
output
0 = u (Q - E) C4)
where u is the ratio of total domestic output to total locally available 
output CE = exports]
CQ - E] = zCQ-E+M] (5}
where z is the ratio of locally available,output to total domestic 
consumption CM = imports]
Using C3] to [5] we can write :
Qg = w.u.z.TDC = ÿ .  f^.TDC C6)
where TDC = total domestic consumption = Q - E + M
By differentiating C6], we get :
dQg = u.z.TDC.du +w.z.TDC.dw +w.u.TDCdz+ w.u.z.DCTDC] C7]
This identity enables us to split the increase in the output of small 
enterprises into four components:
Ca] the first term shows the increase in the small enterprises’ share 
in total domestic output;
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Cb] the second term shows the effect of the increase in domestic
output relative to the locally absorbed domestic output. In
other words, it shows the effects of export expansion;
Cc) the third term is' the increase of locally absorbed domestic
output relative to total domestic consumption, i.e. the . ‘ 
effect of import substitution; and
Cd) the fourth term is the increase in output due to the increase 
in total domestic consumption.
Having analytically split the growth of small, enterprises into four
parts, the next step is to quantify the importance of these factors.
This is done by estimating the coefficients in equation [7] with
multiple regression analysis, 5/- ;  ^ ,_
The multiple regression results are shown in Table V.l,
5/ Sector 32 (oil' refining'products) is.included.
, /  
■ /!
i
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We can advance our statistical analysis a step further by calculating 
the "beta coefficients" or, as they are sometimes called, the standard
. g  . ' ■partial regression coefficients , This technique makes the regression 
coefficients directly comparable by converting the regression variables 
into units of standard deviations and thus enables us to gauge the 
relative importance of the independent variables on the variation of the 
dependent variable. * •
The technique involves multiplying the regression coefficients by the 
ratio of standard deviations, as follows :
s
b-j = bj
y
where b^ = the coefficient of j independent variable
8j = the standard deviation of j variable
Sy = the standard deviation of the dependent
variable
This technique yields the regression coefficient of the "standardized" 
variable
- * 7Xj - Xj"V"
The results of these calculations are given in Table ' y,2 -
A.S. Goldberger; Econometric Theory, J. Wiley & Sons, 1964, 
pp. 197-8. For an application in Economics, T. Hitiris:, Effective 
Protection and Economic Performance in U.K. Manufacturing Industry 
1963 and 1968, the Economic Journal, 1978, pp.107-120.
The interpretation of b*^ is as follows: Suppose b*^ = 0.6. This 
means that when there is a 1 standard deviation change in , there 
will be a 0.6 standard deviation change in Y.
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Examination of the beta coefficients in Table V.2 yields the 
following conclusions,- The greatest influence on the growth of 
small-scale enterprises is due to the fourth factor, namely, the • 
expansion of total domestic demand. The second most important 
factor is the first variable, namely, the increase in the small 
enterprises* share of the home market relative to the large 
enterprises. Third in importance is the third variable, namely, 
import substitution, i.e. the growth of small enterprises 
relative to the competing imports. Fourth is the second variable 
which indicates that the increase in exports also contributed 
to the growth of small enterprises.
To sum up, two general conclusions may be drawn from the above 
analysis. First, small enterprises seem to have grown partly by 
gaining markets previously served by large enterprises. Secondly, 
the small enterprises have grown by replacing competing imports. 
Thus, not only have small enterprises stood their ground in the 
Greek market but have even stood the foreign competition quite 
successfully.
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CHAPTER VI 
GREEK INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
VIS - A - VIS SMALL ENTERPRISES
It is safe to say that'industrialisation in Greece started after 1922 
with the influx of Asia Minor refugees. For about a decade industrialisation 
advanced in a quite liberal climate. The Great Depression, however, which ■ 
reached Greece in Mid-Thirties, forced the State to intervene actively in 
the process of industrialisation and until now, to play an important role 
in it.
Small size of the domestic market (whether in terms of population or 
of purchasing power),chronic structural unemployment, a high level of protect­
ion from foreign competition plus active state intervention combined to 
the creation of a quite particular problem in the case of Greek industry: 
namely, the exorbitant mumber of small industrial enterprises (Table V.l.)
TABLE V.l.
Size Distribution of Manufacturing Establishments 
Size Group 1958 1953 1969 1973 1978
Persons employed
Up to 9 ■ 94.7 95.1 95.0 93.5 93.5
10-49 4.6 . 4.2 4.2 5.5 5.5
50 and over .7 - .7 .8 1.0 1.2-
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ' 100.0
Sources:' Census of Industry and Mining 1958 - 1963 - 1969 -1973 and 1978. National 
Statistical Service of Greece (N.S.S.G.)
I shall deal first with the Legal Framework, then with the Institut­
ional infrastructure and finally with the legislated incentives.
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1. Legal Framework.
The first reaction by the Greek State to the Great Depression, was
to impose high tariff walls and quotas.(Law 5436/1932). Shortly after-
wards,in order to prevent collapse of the existing production capacity,
a whole system of entry and expansion controls was imposed (Law 29/1935).
Though often amended, this system remained in force, in all essential
1/respects, until 1962. In that year, in view of the impending association
with the E.E.C., a new Decree was passed (Decree 4256/62). Whereas the 
1935 Law aimed at protecting the existing industry by establishing as 
criteria the productive capacity of the existing enterprises in relation 
to demand,the new 1962 legislation was oriented towards the promotion 
of industrial development by replacing the aforementionned '*saturation" 
principle of 1935 by the criteria of international competitiveness, 
national economic interest, size of the venture and the reliability of 
the enterpreneur. However,the same bureaucratic procedures are still 
involved: Various ministries and institutions are responsible for the
granting of permissions: in certain cases, goint ministerial decisions 
are required. .
Once the permit is given, things are easier for the establishment 
of a firm, although, it must be stressed, Greek Company Law is full of 
pitfalls. There is a form of personal company where all partners in­
dividually and collectively are responsible for all financial obligat­
ions of the business.
Besides this societal form, Greek Law allows another form of part­
nership where only one member of a firm has unlimited liability for the 
business, while the other partners assume only a limited financial re­
sponsibility.
1/ For the deleterious effects of this practice, see E.S, Mason Monopolistic 
Competition and the Growth Process in Less Developed Countries in Kuenne R.E, (ed.') Monopolistic Competition Theory: Studies in Impact N. York 1967. •
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Public confidence is undermined by the fact that the contents of 
the agreement of the partnership are not publicly announced. The sum­
mary of a deed of partnership is posted to the Court of First Instance 
which is located only in the capital-of each province. Public confidence 
is further undermined by the fact that there is no legal requirement for 
a minimum capital to be. deposited, a fact that leads often to fraudulent 
actions on the part of the founders. A third pitfall must be referred 
to the absence of.any state control over who actually manages the affairs 
of a limited (personal) partnership. In most cases, it is the limited 
liability partners who do this. Even the fully liable persons carry only 
an apparent liability because in most cases they do not possess any wealth. 
Very often the active partner is the wife or sister or father who haw al­
ready disposed of his(her) property. The Court of First Instance never 
enquires into the status of the active partners.
Greater publicity and safeguards are contained in the legislation 
governing Limited Liability companies (introduced in 1955) and Sociétés 
Anonymes (basic Law 2190 of 1920). The main drawback of the corporate 
legislation lies in the relationship between stockholders and management: 
the directors of a Société Anonyme are elected by simple majority rule and 
may be removed from office at the will of the majority, without reason or 
justification. This voting system tends to perpetuate the oligarchy in 
large business enterprises and presents an obstacle to the development of 
managerial capitalism in Greece. In. short, the major effect of Greek 
Company Legislation has been the encouragement of the small closed family 
enterprise (Ellis, p. 180-81),
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The legal status governing the cooperatives and cooperations is also 
limping. The basic Law is 502 of 1915, modified since then, by no less 
than 140 Laws. It is modelled'^after the then existing German Law. In 
a study ■ by K.E.V.A. the generally prevailing idea that greek business­
men are too individualistic to cooperate among themselves is idiscarded as 
wrong. Instead, the inadequate legal status is blamed. The study sug­
gests Greek Government to follow the French Paradigm and introduce new 
legal forms for cooperation.^^.. ' - ..
..  ; T%e proposed (French) form is called group­
ment d ’ intérêt économique (G.I.E.). So far, nothing has taken place.
2. Institutional Framework.
The state policy towards industry is carried through the Ministry 
of Industry and is coordinated with the general economic policy through 
the Ministry of (Economic) Coordination. There is a special director­
ship in the Ministry of Industry (established by Decree 3876/1958) with 
authority: (i) to formulate and implement the policy concerning small 
scale industry; (ii) to supervise the main organisation charged with the 
development of small industry (E.O.M.M.E.H.-see below). This department 
does nothing more than advise the Minister; its personnel consists of no 
more than 8 persons (in a Ministry employing 1.045 persons),far too few 
to carry out the duties they are responsible for.
There are certain semi-autonomous institutions supporting the state ' 
industrial policy. By Decree No 2473 of 1953 the Greek Productivity Centre 
(ELKE pa) was founded to provide technical assistance for Greek firms.
The Greek Productivity Centre has reduced its activities in this field
V Cooperatives and cooperations by KE.V.A. Athens 1976 (in Greek only).
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since the Small Industry Development Centre was created (in 1969), con­
fining" them virtually only in the provinces. The Productivity Centre 
is mainly engaged in organising seminars on organisation, cost planning', 
data processing systems, etc. ■ •
In 1958^the National Handicrafts Organisation (E.Q.H.) was created with _ 
the aim of developing home craft' industries and artistic craft industry.
Its tasks was to he^p preserve, expand and utilize fully these industries, 
to give technical assistance to the producers and provide them with small 
low-interest loans. In 1969 the Small Industry Development Centre (KE.V.A.) 
was founded (Decree 332/69), to assist in the development of small and 
medium industries. Its tasks was to provide technical assistance to firms, 
to undertake studies on the optimum size for each branch, and to promote 
cooperatives and subcontracting. Both organisations had low standards of 
internal organisation, lacked adequately trained personnel and had in­
sufficient financial resources at their disposal. In 1978 both organisa­
tions were merged in the Greek Organisation for Medium and Small Industry 
and Handicrafts (E.O.M.M.E.H.) with the same activities assigned to each 
one of them. It is still too early to assess whether this merger will . 
solve the problems the previous institutions had and whether the efficiency 
will improve. It should be noted, however, that the personnel of E.O.M.M.E.H, 
engaged in consultancy, numbers no more than 15 persons, while small-medium 
•firms number 120,000.
In 1969, the Organisation for Promotion of Exports (O.P.E.) was found­
ed to promote exports of small and medium firms. Till now, its activities 
,have been limited to general studies indentifying export problems and to 
the organisation of exhibitions in Greece and.abroad.
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Finally, the Chamber of Small Industry falls far short of being a 
very decisive channel of information exchange between Government and 
Small Industry. Its active rola in policy making is negligible. Its 
activities have been reduced to some red tape work and to the ex post 
criticism of industrial policy.
2. Incentives.
There is a mosaic of incentives concerning industrial development.
As a mather of fact, however, these incentives have not been different­
iated, until recently, according to the size of a unit.
This has led to a ^  facto application of these incentives to large firms
while the small.firms have benefited only marginally . In 1978, a first .
step was taken to,harmonise the Greek incentive system to the E.E.C.
schemes. This is Law 849/22.12.1978.by which the general tax and credit
3/concessions are granted irrespective of the firm's accounting system 
so that both large and small firms may benefit.
These concessions refer to investments (interest-free loans for 10 years) 
and increased deductions from taxable net profits covered by these invest­
ments. There are, however, three restrictive conditions vis-a-vis small 
firms: (a) in the case of expansion of an already existing firm, the firm 
should already employ at least 6 persons; (b) in the case.of new firms, 
the investment should at least create 6 jobs; and (c) the investment expendi­
ture should not be less than 3 million drs, which amount is somewhat higher 
than the minimum amount required by the E.E.C. Regional Development Fund.
3/ Greek Law allows four different systems of Book keeping in increasing 
degree of sophistication.
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The only measure taken specifically in favour of small-medium 
industry was the creation of a special Fund in 1966(Decision 1421/66 
of Monetary Commission as modified by Decisions 197/11/3.4.78 and 
301/1/8.8.78.). The Fund purported to secure finance for small firms 
on favourable terms. This was considered necessary because: (a) the 
cost of finance was higher for the small firms and (b) the Commerc­
ial Banks-were very reluctant to lend small--firms for two reasons
(i) high banking . cost and (ii) low level of security.
By'Decision 1421/655 Commercial Banks were obliged to assign 
6 per cent of their new deposits (since the beginning of 1966) to this 
Special Fund. From this Fund, firms are financed which (1) are members 
of the Chamber of Small Industry; (2) are engaged in manufacturing 
activity amounting to at least 50 per cent of their total turnover; and
(3) have a high value added. These loans (concerning fixed as well as 
working capital) are granted for a period up to 12 years at an interest 
.rate 3 points below the market rate.. Furthermore credits given from 
this Fund, are guaranteed by the State up to 70-100 per cent of the 
total amount.
The upper limit for this special financing, is 20 million drs. subject 
to the condition that a firm's total borrowings from Commercial Banks 
do not exceed 30 million drs. Export financing and discounted. Promissory 
Notes are not included in these amounts. .
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Government provides the guidelines. The second level refers to policies 
.formulated by the various Ministries; As far as the Five-Year Plans are
concerned, we must note that apart from the fact that they are not im­
plemented (there is no monitoring of the Plan at any level), they do not 
contain clear concepts as to the branches in which future investment 
should be guided. Past National Plans failed to work out a master plan 
for future industrial development. .
As far as the five specialised institutions looking after small- 
industry.are concerned(General Directorship / Ministry of Industry, EL.KE.PA., 
E.O.M.M.E.H., O.P.E. , and Chamber of Small Industry).., it is safe to argue 
that they do not perform their tasks effectively. Individual reasons have 
'been given. For all of them, apply the following:
There has not been a clearly defined policy with regard to small industries.
The sphere of responsibility among them has not been clearly defined.
Their annual programmes are drawn up in isolation and without reference 
to the National Plan. Each one is answerable to a different Ministry.
As a result their activities have been reduced to spasmodic.interventions.
2. Incentives. ,
As said previously. Industrial promotion policy formulated by the
various Ministries (Coordination, Industry, Agriculture, Commerce, Finance)
and Authorities (Monetary Commission), apart from not being connected to
the National Plan in any way, consists.mainly of a mosaic of incentives.
Until recently these incentives consisted of financial aids (tax and credit
concessions),' Because, however, t^e above incentives required a sophisticated 
accounting system, their range of application was constrained to large firms only.
1/ The first exception to the rule is the Law 1116/January 1981 which affords
investment grants, being provided without any differentiation-as to the kind
of product or the firm's size.
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The maximum prices, by taking little or no account of qualitative 
differences, led to unfair competition between good and not so good 
products* at the expense of the .'consumer.
Maximum prices also led to.certain price stability for long periods 
with negative results on competition. In short, the price controls 
benefited the marginal firms swelling their numbers.
The whole system has changed with the accession of Greece to the 
E.E.C. The Government, now, lets the market forces free ex ante, but 
intervenes ex post, in case the outcome is unfavourable. This inter­
vention is more sophisticated than before (when it was simply a police 
control). Now the State tries to assist the forces of competition by, 
i.e., subsidising small importers to compete with large importers 
(with monopolistic power).
The distorted state of competition in industrial markets has had 
its effect on the productive efficiency of greek enterprises. In her 
analysis (data 1969) Mrs Nicolaou found out that "monopoly pricing in 
the product markets as well as monopsony pricing in the wage'determin­
ation placed the larger units at the top of the efficiency scale ob­
tained from the estimation of a Divisia index. The production function
estimates have clearly overthrown the conclussions drawn from this index
3/and have, in fact, turned its efficiency ranking upside down!"
In other words because of the oligopolistic market structure large 
enterprises failed to exploit economies of scale resulting from better 
organisation (an X-inefficiency).
Mrs Nicolaou goes on suggesting "...an industrial policy which foc­
uses on expanding the scale of operation to promote productivity growth 
will be less effective than a policy which strives to establish healthy
competition and to enhance the role of the price mechanism in resource allocation" (p. 169).
•3/ C. Nicolaou: Intersize Efficiency Differentials in Greek Manufacturing KEPE 1978.
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(3) One should not discount the opportunities for the development 
of (some) small units into larger enterprises within the context 
of a large market such as the E.E.C. (see Chapter 2 of S.J, Frais: 
The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain; C.U.P, 1975).
Moreover the Greek State plans to set up some large industrial 
complexes; it is hoped that they will act as catalysts in the 
economic development of the country.
(4) Last but not least, there is the possibility of resource al­
location within the E.E.C. The Greek small industry can undertake 
subcontracting for big European Firms, at least in certain branches 
such as engineering. In such branches there is comparative advant­
age where the techniques are labour in^^nsive and the transportation
' 4/cost is law because of the small volume of these products.
4/ C. Berthomieu and A. Hanaut: Can International Subcontracting Promote 
Industrialization? International Labour Review; May-June 1980
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CHAPTER VII 
APPRAISAL OF GREEK INDUSTRIAL POLICY
It is. difficult to be critical about Greek industrial policy since 
industrialisation has been relatively successful and from 1978 O.E.C.D. 
has classified Greece under the acronym N.I.C. (Newly Industrialised 
Country). But although industrial output has increased at a satisfac­
tory rate (see table VI 1), the basic weakness qf Greek industry (its 
Achilles heel), namely the
TABLE VI 1
Gross Domestic Product in Greek,Manufacturing 
(branches 20-39)
Million Drs, at 1970 prices
Year G.D.P. Annual Rate of Growth
(%)
1960 18.430 1973/1960: 10,7
1973 - 69.228 1979/1973:' 4,2
1979 88.750 1979/1960: 8,6
^urce: National Accounts of Greece.
existence of very many units, still remains . I shall try to describe • 
the various inconsistencies which hinder the effective application of. 
an industrial policy aiming at overcoming this weakness. I shall, also, 
give some information (quantitative as well as qualitative) regarding 
the hitherto effect of such a policy.
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■1. Policy Making.
Under the claustrophobic system, established in mid-thirties, the
interests of the existing industrialists became the only guiding force
of state intervention while the absence of foreign competition made
dubious the international cost comparisons. With the Athens Agreement
of early 60's a new phase started. Foreign trade has gradually been
liberalised not only vis-a-vis the E.E.C. countries but, also, vis-a-
vis third countries under the Common Customs Tariff. Moreover, market
entry controls haven't been linked any more to the degree of saturation,
but to optimal size requirements and to the economic soundness of the
project. However, the implementation of this policy has not been based 
.
on defailed studies of the optimum size by branch, the intra-sectoral 
forward and backward linkages and the long-term prospects of each branch. 
Due to the absence of such studies, and the "fixed idea" of policy mak­
ers that big size is always more efficient, priority has been given to 
the establishment of large units without any regard for branches where 
small size is more efficient. The exploitation of possible growth oppor­
tunities which could have resulted from a systematic development of small- 
medium firms in certain branches, had never crossed the mind of policy 
makers. On the contrary, all efforts have been concentrated to motiv­
ate and assist small firms to grow into bigger units. Tax or credit con­
cessions for small units have only been provided after considerable press­
ure from their part and justified more on social than on economic grounds. 
In short, a branch differentiating policy has never been formulated.
The formulation of industrial policy in Greece takes place in two 
levels. The first level concerns the policies suggested by the Five-year 
Plan of Economic and Social Development, drawn up by the Centre of Planning 
and Economic Research (K.E.P.E. which is supervised by the Ministry of Co­
ordination) .
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Moreover, the various rules of aid were altered very often. As a result 
both estimation of their implementation cost arid the evaluation of their 
effectiveness are almost imposs^ible.
As far as Law 849/1978 is concerned, I have asked the director 
responsible for its implementation. He is in the Ministry of Coordinat­
ion instead of the Ministry of Industry; a symptom of bad organisation of 
Public Administration. He has informed me that the Law has been quite 
successful notably with the small-medium enterprises. In 1980, appr. 800 
million Drs worth of investment schemes were benefited from the Law, 90 
per cent of these schemes concerning small enterprises. The amount pro­
vided by the Law is not very high but it is, not insignificant either.
The Director is quite happy from its application and, all in all, he con­
siders it as a successful law.
As far as the Special Fund is concerned (Monetary Commission Decision 
1421/1966) the verdict must be mixed. The Monetary Commission Decision 
is still (see below) incomplete. First, the difference between the market 
interest rate and the ex legis lower interest rate to small units is not 
subsidised by the state: it is to be borne by the Commercial Banks. 
Secondly, the State does not compel the Commercial Banks to limit the se­
curities they ask for, to the non-guaranteed by the State part. Thirdly, 
two important Banks are exempted from the Special Fund scheme:
The Industrial Development Bank (ETVA) because it does not accept deposits 
and the Agricultural Bank because it is a specialised bank.
As a result, the credit policy aimed at by the Financial Authorities, 
in practice worked as follows :
(1) The Commercial Banks have an interest to pursue as far as possible 
the financing of small business from their own funds and not from the 
Special Fund.
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(2) The Commercial Banks do not limit the guarantees (usually collateral 
securities) to the uncovered by the State part but instead they usually 
ask for guarantees twice as high the amount of the loan.
V.As a result, a large part of the Special Fund remained unused with 
the Banks. On 31.12.1977, 9,073 million Drs were unused while only 7,857 
million Drs had been Advanced. From their own reserves, commercial Banks 
had advanced another 15,674 million Drs (Source: Bank of Greece)“.
The State stepped in by modifying Decision 1421 by (Monetary Commis­
sion) Decision 197/1978.
’’Although no major institutional change has been introduced (such as, 
i.'e., subsidisation of interest, legal limitation of securities to non­
guaranteed by the State part) some minor changes have been introduced such 
as: financing of land and buildings, the personal credibility of the enter-
’preneur as a security, a certain relaxation of the terms of the loan.
Prima facie, these marginal changes have nonetheless worked. On 31.12.1978 
there were 6,617 million Drs unused while 15,133 million Drs were advanced. 
On 31,12.1979, 5,384 million Drs were unused while 21,867 million Drs were 
advanced (Data from the Bank of Greece). This constitutes a great improve­
ment over the past. The fact is however that the small industry remains 
underfinanced relatively to the large industry despite its importance in 
numbers, value added and capital (From Table 24 of Bank of Greece: Month­
ly Statistical Bulletin January 1980, small industry shared 13,2 per cent 
of total industrial credit in 1979)*
3. Market Structure.
Competition in most branches of Greek Industry is very low. The 
simultaneous existence within a given market of a few large firms and a 
great number of small ones - The imperfect polypoleion, Prof. X.Zolotas 
spoke about in 1978' - is, at first glance, puzzling.
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Clearly, the large producers are permitting their small domestic 
competitors to remain in business and are setting their own prices 
in accordance with the prices of the marginal producers. A "live- 
and-let-live" attitude. Driving out a small family producer is also 
difficult, since he is often willing to work for very little and does 
not calculate costs in the sophisticated way, the large enterprise 
does. Large differential profits obviously result from such a market 
structure. In 1979 the 100 largest incorporated industrial firms ac­
counted for 62 per cent of total profits of all S.A..& Ltd,industrial 
units (3.002). The 10 largest firms accounted for 36 per cent of all 
profits (ICAP Directory 1981).
The State helped to perpetuate this situation through the price 
controls it applied. Price controls were established after World War II 
to combat Black Market and hyper-inflation which followed the war. Ministerial 
Decrees (Ministry of Commerce) used to establish maximum prices for, a 
large number of industrial products (nearly all foods and beverages, as 
well as, sudh diverse goods as soaps, fertilizes and medicines).
The Law (Emergency Law 10/1944 as modified by Decree 782/1948) did not 
specify which costs should be taken into consideration. In practice, a 
committee used to investigate the costs of a number of firms in the 
relevant industry and determine a maximum price supposedly correspond­
ing to an average price for the industry. Putting asside the excessive 
number of regulations, the const antly changing classifications, the 
erratic application of the regulations etc., we come to the fact that 
maximum profit rates favour the marginal firms and either the enter­
preneur is forced to overstate costs or he is.deprived of the incentive 
to reduce costs.
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4. Summary and prospects. .
The picture which emerges from the preceding analysis is that 
small-industry was - Until recently - quite unaided. Its growth 
story was however a success story.
As described in the previous section, oligopolistic influences 
exerted a rather retarding effect on the restructuring of Greek 
industry. But one should not deny that, over the past twenty years, 
a wind of liberalisation and keen competition breathed over greek 
industry and, nonetheless, small units survived quite successfully.
Greece's accession to the E.E.C. will bring about an even great­
er change in the market environment of Greek industry in general and 
of small industries in particular. The problem of survival takes up 
new dimensions, .
Mrs Nicolaou offers four reasons for a justified optimism in her . 
paper: "Small and Medium Industry in Greece: Problems and Policies."
(to be published)
(1) Greek enterpreneurs are quite experienced in managing small-med­
ium enterprises. Moreover, Greek worker is more productive in an en­
vironment which allows him to participate directly in the production 
process. , ,
(2) A modus vivendi must be found between the strong individualism 
of a greek enterpreneur and the need for collaboration.
By adoption of a new legal medium of cooperation (see Chapter V) plus 
some fiscal concessions (see Kathimerini .19.2.1981) this compromise can 
be achieved.
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A P P E N D I C E S
APPENDIX I 
The Two-digit sectors of Greek Industry
V.
20 • Food preparation excep;^ beverages
21 Beverage industries
22 Tobacco manufactures
23 Manufacture of textiles
24 Manufacture of footwear and sewing 'of fabric
25 Wood and cork
26 Furniture and fixtures
27 Manufacture of paper
28 Printing and publishing
29 Leather and fur products
30 Rubber and plastic products
31 Chemical industries
32 Petroleum and coal refining ,
33 Non-metallic mineral products
34 Basic metal industries
35 Fabricated metal products except machinery
36 Machinery and appliances except electrical
37 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies
38 Transport equipment
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
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APPENDIX II
The 54 manufacturing three-digit sectors 
included in the sample
202 Dairy products -
203 Canning and preserving of fruits, vegetables, fish and other 
sea foods
204 Vegetables and animal oils and fats
ft206,207 Bakery, confectionery and sugar refineries
208 Manufacturing of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery
209 Miscellaneous food preparations
211 Ethyl alcohol and alcoholic liquors
212,213 Wine industries and Breweries
214 Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries
231 Spinning and weaving of wool
232 Spinning and weaving of cotton
233 Spinning and weaving of silk and synthetic fibres
235 Thread mills, loose and narrow woven fabric manufacturing
236 Knitting mills
241 Footwear
243 Weaving apparel sewing
244 Made-up textile goods, except wearing apparel
251 Sawmills, planning and other wood mills.
252,
259 Cork and miscellaneous wood products
26 Furniture and fixtures
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272 Articles of paper and paperboard
291 Leather tanning and finishing
292 Fur processing .
293 Leather products expect wearing apparel
301 Rubber products -
302 Plastic products
1 1* 9  ^ « « « * —• ■ • - • «312 Industrial chemicals, except fertilizers
313 Paints and varnishes 
314,315 Drugs, perfumes and cosmetics
32 Petroleum and coal refining
331 Structural, clay products and refractories
332 Glass and glass products
333 Pottery, china and earthenware
339 Miscellaneous non-metallic products
351 Ironware
352 Structural metal products
354 Household metal appliances except electrical
356 lion castings
357 Copper, bronze and lead articles
361 Manufacture and repair of internal combustion engines
363 Farm machinery and tractors
364 Mining and quarrying machinery
365 Food products machinery
366 Woodworking and tin industry machinery
-94"
367 Fire extinguishers, pumps, spraying machinery
388 Office and sewing machines
369 Boiler and other machine shops
371 Electrical machinery
372 Batteries -
374 Lamps and illuminated displays 
373,
375 Conduits and electrical supplies
376 Telecommunication equipment 
377,
378 Miscellaneous electrical appliances [including medical apparatus)
'383 Motor vehicles
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APPENDIX IV
Correspondence between the 54 three-digit sectors of Greek manufacturing 
and the S.I.T.C. (Standard International Trade Classification).
S.I.T.C. .
202 022 Milk and cream
023 Butter
024 Cheese and curd
203 032 Fish in containers and fish preparations
□52 Dried fruit including artificially dehydrated
053 Fruit preserved and fruit preparations
055 Vegetables, roots and tubers preserved
204 091 Margarine and shortening
411 Animal oils and fats
421 Fixed vegetable oils
422 Other fixed vegetable oils
431 Animal/vegetable oils and fats, processed
206, 207 048.4 Bakery products
061 Sugar and honey
062 Sugar confectionery
208 073 Chocolate and other food preparations cont. cocoa
209 061 Feed-stuff for animals
099 Food preparations N.E.S.
211 112.4 Distilled alcoholic beverages
212, 213 112 Alcoholic beverages
minus112,4 Distilled alcoholic beverages
214 111 Non-alcoholic beverages
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231 651.2 Yarn of wool and animal hair
653.2 Woollen fabrics
232 651.3 Cotton yarn and thread, not mercerized
651.4 Cotton yarn and thread, mercerized
652 Cotton fabrics
233 651.1 Silk yarn and thread '
651.6 Yarn and thread of synthetic fibres
651.7 Yarn and thread of regenerated fibres
651.8 Yarn of grass fibres
651.9 Yarn of textile fibres N.E.S.
653.1 Silk fabrics woven
653.5 Fabrics woven, of synthetic fibres
653.6 Fabrics woven of regenerated fibres
235 654 Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons, trimmings
236 653.7 Knitted fabrics not elast. nor rubberised
241 851 Footwear
243 841 Clothing except fur clothing
244 656 Made up articles, wholly or chiefly of textile
material
251 631 Veneers, plywood, boards, and other wood worked
252, 259 632 Wood manufactures
633 Cork manufactures
26 621 Furniture
272 641 Paper and paperboard
642 Articles of paper, pulp and paperboard
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291 611 Leather .
292 613 Fur skins, tanned or dressed
842 Fur clothing
293 612 Manufacture of leather or of artificial or
reconstituted leather.
831 Travel goods, handbags and similar articles
301. 621 Materials., of ..rubber
629 Articles of rubber, kUE.S.
302 ' 581 Plastic materials .
893 Articles of artificial plastic materials
311, 312 513 Inorganic chemicals
514 : Other inorganic chemicals
313 531 Synthetic organic dyestuffs
532 Dyeing and tanning extracts, synthetic tanning 
materials
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials.
314, 315 541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour materials
553 Perfumery, cosmetics, dentifrices, etc.
32 332 Petroleum products
521 Crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and gas
331 662 Clay and refractory construction materials
332 664 Glass
665 Glassware
333 666 Pottery
■ , 812.2 Sinks, wash basins, baths of ceramic materials
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339 663 Non-mineral manufactures N.E.S.
351 676 Rails and Railway track construction material ’ .
. of iron and steel
677 Iroh-and steel wire, excluding wire rod
678 Tubes, pipes and fittings of iron and steel
693 Wire products - excluding electric and fencing 
grills.
698.3 Chain and parts thereof of iron and steel
698.4 Anchors, grapnels and parts of iron or steel
698.5 Pins and needles of iron or steel
698.6 Springs and leavers for springs/iron-steel-copper
352 ■ ,691 Finished structural parts and structures, N.E.S,
692 Metal containers for storage and transport
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets and similar 
articles
698.1 Locksmith wares
812.1 Central heating apparatus and parts
354 697 Household equipment of base metals
356 679 Iron stell castings, forgings unworked, N.E.S.
357 682.2 Copper and alloys of copper, worked
685.2 Lead, and lead alloys, worked
361 711.5 Internal combustion engines, not for aircraft
711.6 Gas turbines, other than for aircraft
711.8 Engines, N.E.S.
363 712 Agricultural machinery and implements
364 716.4 Construction and mining machinery, N.E.S
718.5 Mineral crushing, etc. and glass-working machinery
365 718.3 Fond processing-machines, excluding domestic
- 100 -
366 719.5 Powered tools, N.E.S.
367 719.2 Pumps and centrifuges
368 714 Office machines
717 Textile and leather machinery
369 711.1 steam generating boilers
711.2 Boiler house plant
711.3 Steam engines and steam turbines
715 Metalworking machinery
718.1 Paper mill and pulp mill machinery
718.2 Printing and bookbinding machinery
719.3 Mechanical handling equipment
719.4 Domestic appliances - non-electrical
719.6 Other non-electrical machines
719.7 Ball, Roller or needle-roller bearing
719.8 Machinery and mechanical appliances, N.E.S.
719.9 Parts and accessories of machinery
371 722.1 Electric power machinery
725 Domestic electrical equipment
372 729.1 Batteries and accumulators
374 729.2 Electric lamps
812.4 Lighting fixtures, and fittings, and parts
373, 375 722.2 Apparatus for electrical circuits
723 , Equipment for distributing electricity
376 724 Telecommunications apparatus
377,378 726 Electrical apparatus for medicinal purposes
729.3 Thermionic valves and tubes, transistors
729.4 Automotive electrical equipment
- 101 -
729.5 Electrical, measuring and controlling instruments
729.B Electro-mechanical hand tools
729.9 Electrical machinery and apparatus, N.E.S.
■X,
383 732 Road motor vehicles
minus732.9 Motor cycles, motorized cycles
- 102 -
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APPENDIX V I I
NUMBERS AND SKILL INTENSITIES IN GREEK MANUFACTURING
BY SECTOR, 1963-1970
Skills Skills umber of.EnterprisesSectors
1963 1970 Small Small
1963 1970 1970
35.36 1767202 38.28 1 9 2 1
9.26203 515
3 5 6 0
6135
270
2 0 4
206-7
27.30
237 217
. 208 1 4 . 9 0 22
209 1 0 5 5 127 1731
1969211 37.85 2122
283 3 1 0
2 1 4 49228.27 379
231 812 1 2 9 151
627 2262 3 2 513 172
2 3 3 73 292 202
7.79 32
2 3 6 6.80 1 1 2 5
6113
161 51
194 1729
241 201 209
9.96 160883 3 6 387
1 3 5 112.93
8776251 8208 194184
29778.22 3775252, 259
7010 2517.95 201 9 7 9 0
86212272 22980 80
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cont,/
291 15.26 . 18.46 584 42 421 35
292 .28 1.69 237 115 817 131
293 6. 68 9.60 723 51 700 43
301 13.63 . 24.20 505 60 770 ^ 49
f
302 14.58 19.58 - 189 84 397 149
311, 312 33.10 53.09 68 60 81 - 50
313 29.85 37.12 65 20 77 24
314, 315 35.71 46.92 86 58 124 69
32 . 45.88 64.13 54 16 54 36
■') 331 8.28 13.31 816 230 434 193
332 11.16 14.10 127 34 159 34
■V ■ 333 11.34 16.50 523 30 464 40
j. 339 12.07 ■ "19.79 2111 157 " 3279 ■ 172
Mr' 351 13.05 19.87 175 43 161 68
352 7.05 16.80 2251 96 5696 117
0» 354 7.84 17.89 3054 41 3360 45
356 . 5.63 12.24 147 44 206 40
357 7.73 8.76 556 49 569 ' 50
361 • 9.00 13.09 255 51 251 44
363 15.23 27.93 412 50 799 46
364 6.89 16.43 26 9 95 23
365 6.80 11*21 80 17 136 225
366 5.21 9.09 40 23 51 11
S<r 367 13.04 13.21 127 - 36 209 32
•0 368 100.00 50.41 108 3 156 6
369 8.55 13.51 865 J06 1239 133
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cont,/
r
r
371 25.20 18.36 188 25 272 19
372 24.68 30.14 105 9 115 13
374 24.13 29.05 69 16 138 13
373, 375 14.60 21.23 73 24 112 39
376 40.63 27.70 445 5 55 23
377, 378 20.57 25.12 556 97 459 101
383 12.90 14.90 266 67 328 36
r
t
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APPENDIX VIII 
CAPITAL/OUTPUT RATIOS (1969)
Small-scale Industry Large-scale Industry
20 1.3755 0.9589
21 0.6490 1.0325
22 2,4224 • 0.4396
23 1.0760 0.9005
24 0.4409 0.4723
25 1.3178 0.6592
26 0.4850 0.4004
27 1.4845 1.9986
28 0.9185 0.4263
29 1.4435 0.5538
30 1.6087 0.7289
31 1.3383 0.7538
32 . 0.8878 2.9032
33 1.4340 1.5335
34 (21.9570) 1.9514 •
35 0.5695 0.7488
36 1.6642 0.5499
37 0.4764 0.4960
38 1.9420 0.6162
39 1.2257 0.6634
ALL INDUSTRY 0.9896 0.9942
NOTES : Capital; Machinery (Appendix XI)
Output: Value Added (Survey of Industry, I969, NSSG)
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APPENDIX IX
PROFIT MARGINS II SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY (1969) J.r Value Added Labour Rem. Self, Empl. Rem. Gross Pr. Value ‘000 Da%s-%
20
I f
1,971,538 681,510 1/051,343 7,299,049 3.27
21 315,159 94,462 163,254 . 1,303,842 4.41
22 18,462 10,165 504 80,925 9.63
23 747,424 271,116 205,157 2,138,804 12.68
24 1,699,752 342,059 891,413 3,547,461 13.14
25 549,358 118,144 466,623 1,140,387 -3.10
26 999,509 333,530 247,797 2,525,850 16. 56
27 58,165 38,633 12,060 225,303 ' 3.32
28 395,371 109,217 101,236 833,658 22,18
219,416 62,941 57,727 669,521 14.75
<30 94,515 44,602 33.814 297,897 5.40
114,349 47,900 47,528 399,569 4.74
32 15,628 14,372 3,397 43,857 -4. 88
33 438,325 228,013 254,590 930,605 -4.76
34 302 1,912 • 496 1,748 -120.48
35 899,306 244,044 447,928 2,130,160 9.73
36 321,610 120,967 80,324 807,981 14.89
37 199,613 110,804 70,509 767,290 '-2V39
38 318,216 101,332 254,429 749,281 -5/01
*^ 9
0»
,315,829 60,428 93,395 694,267 : 23,33
■ r
’OTAL 9,691,847 3,036,151 4,483,524 26,587,455 8,17
S o u rc e s :  S u rv e y  o f  I n d u s t r y  1969 (NSSG)
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APPENDIX X
PROFIT MARGINS IN LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY (1969)
Value Added Labour Rem. Self Empl. Rem. Gross Pr. Value ',000 Drs.fI
%"ï V,
«0 3,606,642 ' 1,359.105 65,590 14,670,644 \14.87 1
21 957,424 300,843 8,417 2,922,111 22.18 1
22 1,254,061 401,975 3,401 4,357,749 19.48 1
23 4,553,285 ' 1,717,213 46,591 11,347,425 24.58
24 967,025 447,528 42,343 2,504,759 19.05
25 589,765 208,541 19,393 1,412,016 25.63 1
26 421,336 173,044 16,608 875,181
1
26.47 1
27 - 785,466 294,611 6,369 2,430,652 19.93 !Î
28> 974,499 451,646 ■ 17,703 1,676,968 30.12 j
29 • ■ 346,469 143,136 14,761 1,031,363 18.28 1
'30 1,308,666 453,750 11,094 2,654.605 31.79 i*
jl • 2,965,553 860,797 11,025 6.399,462 32.72 1
32 818,575 133,605 714. 3,438,393 19.90
33 2,685,722 891,031 54,389 5,133,071 33.90 I
34 2,466,370 447,109 383 5,864,106 34.43 1
35 1,685,180 650.873 30,998 4,276,787 23.46
36 779,904 367,361 25,013 1,591,166 ■ 24.36
•37 1 ,773,884 ■ 540,499 11,515 .4,313,728 28.33
' 38 /> 1,359,606 ; 779,976 19,946 2,416,521 23.16
39
Ml '
214,507 83,026 6,746 365,118 34.16
■ r
j[OTAL 30,513,939 10,705,669 412,999 79,681,825 24,34
S o u rc e :  S u rv e y  o f  I n d u s t r y  1.969 (NSSG)
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 ^ a p p e n d i x  XI
CAPITAL/LABOUR INTENSITY IN GREEK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1969) », 000 Drs
Small-scale Industry Large-scale Industryr Machinery Labour ..; K/L ' Machinery Labour K/L
2Ï) 2,711,880 49,999 54,24 3,458,571 33,038 104,6s
21 204,553 8,122 25,19 ' 988,505 5,585 176,99 .
22 44,722 233 191,94 551.244 9,774 56,40
23 804.219 14,391 55,88 4,100,190 40,924 100,19
24 749,341 56,290 13,31 456,744 14,253 .32,05
25 723,951 19,056 37,99 388,797 6,523 59,60
26 484,741 18,179 26,66 168,725 4,876 34,60
27 86,346 1,530 56,44 1,569,809 6,380 246,05
2»8 363,160 5,933 61,21 415,384 7,821 53,11
29 . 316,734 4,490 70,54 191,877 3,883 49,41
30 152,047 2,544 59,77 953,917 9,134 104,44
31 153,031 2, 566 59,64 2,235,375 13,759 162,47
32 13,874 340 40,81 3,376,523 1,504 1.580.13
33 628,578 16,361 38,42 4.118,555 17,852 230,71
34 6,631 34 195,03 4,812,891- 5,837 824,55
35 512,166 25,570 20,03 1,261,918: 15.134 83,38-
36 • 535,212 6,280 85,22 428,864 8,659 49,53
37 95,097 7,051 13,49 879,825 11,649 75,53
617,962 13,601 45,44 837,832 14,638 57,24
39K
■ f
387,113 6,369 60,78 142,294 2,169 65,60
ÎTOTfY 9, 591 ,358 258,939 37,04 30,337,840 233,392 129,99
c e s :  V i o t e c h n i a  ( S m a l l - s c a l e  I n d u s t r y  KEPE 1976 )
-  115 -
COoo•H CO U hPh fi
-P O Ü O  0) o Îh *-
§  rf O  *H
gH MW ÊHOX C enM p^ • nOfi Eh ON
# O \—Ph OPh pq-«5 g
(V CV"<h l> 00 CV
O-^  CV CSN v\t> V- tCN C'ACJN 00 'O CV
ON -<^  CTsND CO
OOf\ oco r-
00 T— o
0 -P nO  o  CO en en en CV co <m nO en CV oR  -
C3 -P
CO CO -sf CV T- -Ni-c- er\ £-- -4- o oen CQ CV er\ CT\ O n
en CV en no CV en CV 00 00 o o £>■
o T- co, T'­en On On•Nt ,!>- V—
00 r- nO \— en o nD
ON NO ON CV en ONT- en ON en en 00o l> On en nO CV
co en -si- CV en j>- m "if CV On 00 -V-en ON CVo  -Ni- 00
CTn nO o nOO CV 00 enen CV T— c~-
cv nD CV T- D"J> en 00 CV o-4- CV en CV C)oo en CV
nO  O n en 00 CV nO co0 u e -p >» scd O  Ph o
CQ T- en enen o ND CV co
o nDV- -vV. 00C5N On en
00Nûco oW -p -p ü fi cdM “Ni- -si NÛ enON O n ND • CV0 -P ü Ü 0 O Pi Ooco
-p en -4- o o en en t> £> CV
en -4" NÛ 00 ON ONen -4 CV o CV nOen, nd o en -4 .T-
cvON00
ocoo
coen00
cio
co
r- en o en en nd
nD  CV 00 nD  CV -4CV iS- c-~ T— 00
en en en en en co en ON T- CV en
ON en ON -4 enCJN en T- NÛ î>-o en en *4 CV
CV
CJ
Eh
enNûON
&•P0
a
«H .O :
>»■0>n
CQ
ra0üFhptoCQ
to0)o•H CO Jh NFL, o
-P O  O O  
CD O  A- A 3O  «H
4 aM •SM M
r EhOX < oM Pd i>B fc! CTNM oPh oPn pq< î=>co
4.4 1h f-i 1O O«n Is ON VTN i> ON m o en nO m O vn CD CV ON vn CO COON £> CV CV s— CV On Nû -<4' O'. en -4- Nû '4- vn ON On t>co -P ON rr\ en v~ o T— O 00 o O CJN \— ON co vn '4' -4 vn co4-:) OSh cd On \— CV o O \— 00 On CV o nO O t> ON en CO en Nû NO© U \— V— V en O CV O CV CV •>4' en en CV Nû. enE P vO>s Pî(d oPh o
E rMO Fhh O44 ÎS l> \— o O U"\ nO £>• CO On CV ON o en ON ON vn vn CV 00O <^4- CV m nO co m V— en O -4- T— -4" en D- o o C'­ vn CV nDCQ 4-3 ir\ o en nO m co ON CO NO vn ON o en en vn enP  OPh (d O vO en CV CV ON m On en en CV '-4' co CV nO '-t CV ON o -4•H Pi vr\ T- ON co CV T- CV vrv T~ Y— V— en -4 T— '-4© P V— ON V“ I> T~ r- vnO P0 G CVFn; O
Pü o ON nO en co o ON CV ON ON NÛ en o r- co . T~ -4P CO cr\ o -<4-•O T— en vO CV en -4" ON ON en en vn vnod CVv CV o o V— m co VT\ -4- O o On o ON I> NO ON ; vnon CV en i> CTn C'­ CV VT\ o -4- ON o C" O en NO c- ON vn
P h ir\ m co en c- NÛ ON en NO l> ON en NO c- CO £>nO i> in ON en CTN \— 00 o CO T— en CO en CV co CV NO -4 vnta »Oi £> en en V— CV CV r - CV -4' vn 00 vn r - NO en 00
g ■ T— enC5 i
P4 A«S :§
03 -P -P O Ü Cd (D Jh E -p d cd o FM o
c- nD t nO r- o co en vn vn nO CV NO -4 00 c-CV CO NO en c- 00 nO en oo c- o 00 vn C-’ oT— nO en -4 vn 1 en nO C'­ 1 en 1 T— en en NO co
NÛ o CV en o -4 en vn NO CV -4 en T*“nO c- O' CV
! ir\
w
coCV
ëÊH E ^co O Pî=> Jh  oR 44:5 CV o co c- CV c- T— co en co Nû -4 Nû en en nO NûM CQ p nO vn c- en en m T~ 00 co o vn £> -4 CV 00 V- vn
M P  O o en 1 T— nO CV CV 1 vn vn Nû o 1 vn 1 en NO vn nO r-Ph CdR •H P en ON £> Nû N û . vn NO 00 en en CV Nû CV vn CV< 0 P c- CV N Û c- vn en co en T— -4 CVO Ü P o t— OO T" enCQ 0 O ■;.N1 Pd o CVRR<S p
CQ üP co £> NO co vn co r- vn CV n O en t > C- CV CV m vn c-4? en CO \— O c- vn *4 CV n O 00 00 o -4 en nO CV o CV nO oO 00 en o en C'­ CV en nO en nO CV co 00 t> o 1— N û r- N û ON
U 1
P h en NO vn en en CV en o en CV vn 00 vn P*' vn co -4 00 nO NOvn o NO co CV N û vn CV c^ î c- •4 00 nO en 00 o N û -4 entQ en -4 co nO c- ND CV c- o en -4 en T- co NO O vn 000O £> \— -4 r ~ T— r— t— cv T— coACd CV
, - RO V— CV en -4 vn NO £> co en o V“ CV en -4 vn nO o 00 ONCV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV en en en en en en en en en en E4
g
ci
s-On'
î>»
P ‘tOiF3'
t J i
5:
«H*O
0>^40CO
co0üuFioco
U1<DÜ•H w
t-i Up4 o
*P OÜ O<Do
U
O •H
Ü
I-JE-iO ir\Dti £>E-i O'.%Oom(=1w
A Ao o ch :s CO O LA ON LA CV CA T— c- 00 ON 00 IS E- O CO A( -t -Hi CO<4- t> -Hi -Hi NO -Hi CA T— CA LA o CV 00 E- NO ON NO o -Hi E- CJN03 -P o\ C" V— (A ON On CO ON c- NO NQ NO ON LA E- -Hi o E- nO -Hi+5 Ütq rf o o ON (A CO o -e CJN CV CJN y— T~ LA E- CO CV LA E-m h CO CV -Ht CO ON -<t o —t NO CJN NO CA LA -Ht CO -Hi CV E-S -p CA NO (A CV CV T— CA CJNî>s A •k •kctf O CV -HiPh O
BO f-t0^ ^ oEH «H isCO vJD p- o ON NO NO nO ON NO NO ON CV -Hi -Hi ON NO -Hi ON NO LAl=> CQ -P "cf- CT\ o ON LA LA LA r- LA T“ CO o o 00 -Hi CO CV o O OQ -P Ü -4- o LTV CV O CA CA NO \— o LA o CO CA CA o NO CV -HiA  (dH-l •H 4^ IT\ vO o LA NO CA LA NO £> 'O •T— LA -Hi 00 CV Cki 00 o ON CV0) -P T— -Hi- nO LT\ NO -Hi O -Ht O E- -t NO O LA CV T— c-H O sq Cf\ O o CA CV E- CV CA T— T— o0) o< pq o CA X— COoCO1 -pw \o (ON LTi LA NO LA CV -Hi NO ON -Hi NO CA O CA -Hi LA E- la LAcb PJ cn -<i ON c- CO T— o £> 00 -Hi 00 E- ON CO O NO o ON E-Tq -Hi- CJN -Hi LA 00 CA CV LA LA O -Hi ON ON ON CV NO CAoi-q fH !>• c- I> LA LA CTn C- LA o T— D- CA CO ON E- 00 o o CAPh O (J\ ON -Ht \— 00 NO CA £> o CJN NO C-- LA NO -Hi CV CA CA . -Hi(Y\ o -Ht I> T-1 CV LA (A ÎT- O -i- LA CO LA T— -Ht -Hi LA CVCOCO 00 o ON o CA LA CV NO LA CV co CA 00 LA CA LA NO CV CV CVo . '4- -Hi \— CV CV CV X— ONPh CVC5 1 •00
A}Ph PhO O.cp is vO CT\ CA ON CV CA -Hi LA NO NO £> £> CA CO 00 CO ON COCO CO NO c- C-* NO CV CA ON 1 T— 1 LA CA ON -Hi -HiCO -p -v- -Nt C-- V— o 00 o CO NO CA NO CV E- NO V— ON LA CO•P Opq cd 'V— -Ht C- CA CA T— -Ht o ON CV NO T— O CV© Ph rr\ CO LA CV LA LA CJN -Ht CA CV NOS -P CA CV o>s pq »cd o V-Ph O
KEHCO S A4Î3 O Ph LAe Ph Ô o vD 00 lA X— ON C- CV CA -t -Hi O -Hi -Hi CA LA LA V— E-4n is •h;}- CO CO LA O CA CO CO 00 o c- ON CA LA E- .NO NO c- CJNM CJV CA CO CV -Hi CA NO -<t nO 1 NO 1 CA T— LA -4" T-w -pM -P © T— \— O NO [- CV NO LA P- -Hi O NO CJN LA CJN CA !>snq A  cd T - T— LA CV CV NO 00 LA CO r- -Hi CX3 -H i E- CV CV P4•=ij •H Ph vO LA -Ht T— T— E- •PO © -P wCO o jq r- -Ht pi1 © o TJi-q ' pq o pqi-q M<S ■p «HCO o Opq O o -H i ON NO -H i T— -H t CV CA -H t CA CA ON CO O CA 00 LA E-TP t- CO CO CV ON C-- -H i o CA -H i -H i -H i O NO -H i E- ON CA LA LA nO >>o o ION CJN NO 00 nO O CA LA CV CV LA T- NO LA NO -H i (A E- ON . CA ©Ph >Ph C3N o o NO E- -H t c- —t- CV LA o NO -H i CV E- -H i E- E- CV CV Pi'Hf- l> CO CV vO CA - < i -H i -H i LA V— CO LA CV -H i NO CJN O ON qJ
m T- T— T— LA LA V- C- -j- CA ON NO LA o ON -H i NO O CV ON , CO©o V- T— -4- C- -H t CA \— V— T— -H i NO CV r- CV V— E- *#cv nO ©C5 ©op.,<q oEH ■ o »O V— CV C^i -H i LA NO C- CO ON O T— CV CA - n i LA NO E- OO O n O . CQCV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CA CA CA CA CA CA CA CA CA EH
APPENDIX XV
SUBCONTRACTING
1975
20 Persons and Over INDUSTRY
Current prices 
*000 Dr8
Gross Product Receipts from 
Contract work
Payments for . 
Contract work
20 39.673,847 508 64,173
21 8,690,666 - 14,871
22 9,074,894 1,628 47,358
23 37,920,941 113 2,168,113
24 10,146,615 254 564,210
25 4,113,095 - 6,545
26 1,819,789 4,186 25,821
27 6,130,129 . 267 16,162
28 4,081,532 - 273,867
29 1,587,753 36,052
30 7,509,789 ■ 818 51,826
31 22,697,821 858 93,705
32 28,340,118 1,955 687•
33 14,133,142 12 [ 46,095j
34 23,814,518 2,556 231,171
35 13,630,918 42,078 223,710
36 ‘ 4,766,551 497.292 120,693
37 1 11,483,420 301,199- 82,179
38 1 11,715,085 10,209 340,033
■ 1,243,665 1,286
■
23,783
TOTAL 262,574,288 865,219 4,431,054 !
Sources: Survey of Industry .1.975
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